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
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U. S. TRANSPORT HENDERSON LEAVING QUANTICO, VA., WITH THE FIFTH REGIMENT OF MARINES BOUND FOR NICARAGUA,  
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# The Marine Corps Gazette

VOLUME XII

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## THE CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

BY MAJOR KELLER E. ROCKEY, U.S.M.C.

**F**ROM time to time during the past year circular letters emanating from headquarters have appraised the service of the fact that the "Army Correspondence Courses, modified to meet Marine Corps conditions" have been adopted for the instruction and training of such of its officers who desire to enrol in them. It is the aim of this paper to give a more complete resumé of the project to those officers who either have enrolled or who contemplate doing so, and to forestall that criticism which is based upon a misapprehension of the purposes for which those courses were designed and offered. Profiting by the experience of tentative experimentation in instruction by mail, the Marine Corps launched its present effort under conditions which give it every prospect of continuing activity. The correspondence course branch was established as an integral part of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, but with its own building, staff and clerical personnel. It functions under the Commanding Officer of the schools on a parity with the Field Officers' and Company Officers' Courses, and its instructors are expected to maintain the closest contact with those courses. Every effort was apparently made to provide adequate facilities and to detail from the graduates of the various service schools a staff large enough to handle the work. The work commenced at the beginning of the school year last September.

For its instruction the Army Correspondence Courses are used in so far as is practicable. These courses have by now passed through what might be called an experimental phase of development. The first efforts were designed primarily to provide for the instruction of the officers of the reserve which in the years following the war was being rapidly expanded. During this time a large amount of instructional material was prepared and offered but there was much variation as to method and generally a lack of coördination and the results were not entirely satisfactory. In 1924, a central Army Board went carefully over the whole subject, and guided by the experiences gained up to that time, made plans for a systematic revision upon the present lines. This revision is now almost completed. The plans provide that each branch of the Army, Infantry, Cavalry, Engineers, etc., have three courses, Basic, Company Officers and Advanced. The scope of these courses is fixed so that they parallel the work of the special service schools of the arm and that completion of the final course prepares the student for the Command and General Staff Correspondence Course.

The courses are broken into subcourses, and so arranged that the subjects treated follow in logical order. No attempt is made to cover those subjects

not considered suitable for instruction by correspondence, as for example so important a subject as drill regulations. The lessons are prepared under the direction of the chief of branch concerned. The actual work is done at the branch service schools, the infantry lessons are prepared at Fort Benning, the artillery lessons at Fort Sill and so on. The Command and General Staff Course is prepared at Fort Leavenworth. These agencies are also charged with the duty of keeping the courses revised. When approved and reproduced the papers are sent in the quantity required to the various Corps Areas, each of which conducts its own correspondence school.

The Army similarly furnishes this school with the required number of copies of the various lessons and several copies of an accepted solution thereof and then passes out of the picture. The Army lessons are in the main suitable and applicable and are used without revision. In subjects, however, such as Military Law and Administration, the subcourses are being replaced by others prepared at these Schools.

In the Army preparation or complete revision of one of these courses and the publication of the thousands of copies necessary requires considerable time. Almost by the time the new course appears there have been changes in texts, organization and material which will result in apparent discrepancies. With these changes this rather ponderous system cannot hope to keep pace. The student will find, however, that the instructional value of the lessons is not materially lessened on this account, particularly if he understands the inherent difficulties. This school has replaced certain lessons most in need of revision.

In addition to the courses listed as now available this school hopes later to be able to offer several others. The most important of these is the course on overseas operations, following the lines of the work being conducted in this subject in the Field and Company Officers' Courses. Another is on the subject of aviation, taking up only that part of the subject with which an infantry officer is concerned. Naturally these projects are only in the first stage. It is the present policy of Headquarters to determine the specialty for which a reserve officer is deemed best fitted and to which he will be assigned in case of national emergency. The school is prepared to offer courses on each of the specialties on the present list. As the list is extended to include other specialties, courses covering those additional specialties will be made available.

The work is arranged to the end that each lesson is short enough to complete in one evening. The lesson gives a text assignment for study. Many of the lessons are accompanied by a "memorandum" which corresponds in general to a lecture in a resident school. This memorandum contains information on the subject under consideration which it would be difficult for the student to locate for himself and serves to limit the number of text-books which he must procure. After a study of the text assigned and the memorandum the student is ready to solve the problem. This requires an application of the principles covered in the texts. As a rule the problems are based upon assumed situations, where the student, as the unit commander



or a staff officer, is required to make the decisions expected of a commander or staff officer were the situations real. An effort is made to shape the requirements so that the answers may be short. There is required no lengthy copying from text-books, and no memorizing of assignments. All texts available can be consulted freely in solving the problems. The student may get any assistance he can from other officers and he is encouraged to solve his lessons in company with other officers taking the same course.

There is a sincere effort to make the lessons as interesting as is compatible with instruction, although of course a certain amount of real study on comparatively uninteresting basic subjects is indispensable. The following is a typical example from one of the problems in the Infantry Company Officers' Course. "You are the company commander in a brigade which is to attack. Your company is the battalion reserve. You have received the battalion commander's order for attack which prescribes that your company follow the right assault company. You have a map of the area. You are required to give:

- a. The formation you prescribe for your company when it follows in rear of Company B.
- b. Your location in this formation.
- c. The general route you select, with reasons.
- d. Location of the forward echelon of your company headquarters.
- e. How will you keep in touch with the situation to the front."

The student having solved his problem mails it to Quantico, where an instructor armed with the school solution can pick flaws in it. This school solution is the one which the school believes is most satisfactory. In marking problems, however, due allowance is made for that difference of opinion which makes horse races. There have been cases, although rare, when a resident school has received a solution which was considered better than the school solution. This so far has not happened in the correspondence courses, although papers which received the mark of 100 per cent. are not uncommon. On the other hand, there is no hesitation in stamping the word "unsatisfactory" upon papers which in the opinion of the staff do not measure up to the prescribed standard of 75 per cent. It is not believed that it is the proper rôle of the school to pass out gratuitous marks. For the benefit of those who have been startled by "unsat." on at least one paper, it is only fair to say that they are in the majority.

In the Command and General Staff Course the student is furnished with a copy of the school solution and a very carefully prepared discussion of the problem and the application of the principles involved. In the remainder of the courses the school solution can be furnished only where it is considered particularly necessary, in which case copies are reproduced here. It would be helpful if the school solution were available for issue more extensively.

The comments on the student's solution point out his errors. These comments must be in greater detail than similar comments in the resident school, because there a common error can be treated in conference and, if

there is any misunderstanding on the part of the student, personal contact can clear it up. At this school it is the aim that comments not only point out the students' errors but give reasons, that is, they call attention to the principles which were violated or the factors which the student failed to consider. Each solution is treated in its entirety; what is wrong on one paper may be right on another. For example, the time of attack correct for one scheme of manoeuvre might be too early for another. It is clearly recognized that very careful and painstaking effort in marking papers is indispensable in correspondence instruction and that a perfunctory comparison of the student's solution with the school solution will be fatal.

To obtain the maximum of usefulness it is advisable that administrative methods be very flexible and for this reason the school has very few regulations, none of which can be changed to suit individual cases. There is a rule that a student must submit at least one lesson during each school period of three months and must complete the equivalent of thirty-nine hours' work during the school year of nine months. (The school is inoperative during the months of June, July and August.) This rule, however, is solely for the purpose of eliminating the uninterested and keeping the files clear. Any reasonable request for extension of time to complete the requirements has been granted and if disenrolled because inactive the student may reënrol the next year. A student may enrol at any time and, subject to the minimum requirements, go as fast or slow as he likes. If there seems good reason for doing so, the student may be permitted to select only the subcourses which deal with the particular subjects which he desires, omitting the others. An occasion where this might be desirable is where an officer is preparing for a resident Marine Corps or Army School or for promotion examinations and has only a limited time.

The school allows the student to enrol in the courses which he deems most advantageous provided it is not apparent that he has selected work which is too advanced. It is the rule in the Army that the student starts in the basic course and works up. Our short experience here has clearly demonstrated that good results are not obtained when an officer selects a course without having covered the ground work of the preliminary courses. In this selection the grade of the student often is but should not be the determining factor. If the officer has a good working knowledge of the texts of the preliminary courses he is ready to take up the advanced course, otherwise he should take up as many of the subcourses of the preliminary course as he needs. If he does not he may anticipate a study of the texts of the preliminary courses in addition to his own, provided he knows just which texts to study to get the data he wants. An officer who has completed the work in the present Basic School should take up several of the subcourses in the Infantry Basic Correspondence Course before going on with the Company Officers' Course. Officers who have completed the Company Officers' or Field Officers' Courses in the Marine Corps Schools should be ready to take up the Infantry Advanced and the Command and General Staff Correspond-

ence Courses, respectively. For other officers, where doubt exists, it would be wise to select the more elementary of two courses.

It has been recommended by the Infantry Branch of the Army that the infantry correspondence courses be conducted by the School at Fort Benning, rather than as now by the nine Corps Area Schools. The obvious advantages would be more uniformity in method and more permanence and perhaps better selection of instructing personnel. It would permit the agency which prepares the instructional material to benefit by the actual experience in the administration of the schools. After all the period of development has been relatively short and there is room for improvement both in the instructional material and methods of administration. In centralizing instruction at the schools the Marine Corps is a step ahead of the Army.

The courses are available to all officers of the reserve and regular service and to a small class of the enlisted personnel. This last class consists of those who have been designated for commission in case of an emergency and are required to complete an appropriate course before their designations are confirmed. The correspondence courses in their case have a dual rôle, they serve to give the necessary theoretical education and to eliminate those too indolent or uninterested to work for their advancement.

For the reserve officer the correspondence courses should meet a definite need. There must be some way to provide these officers, located as they are all over the country, with some means of acquiring a military education. Only a few can avail themselves of the well served menu of the resident school, the others must depend upon the cafeteria principle of instruction by mail.

The Marine Corps has decided to make the completion of an appropriate correspondence course a requisite to promotion and for transfer from Volunteer to Fleet reserve. The reserve officer has then an added reward for his efforts. The Marine Corps has also the record of the reserve officer's work in military study, his progress or lack of progress, which data is the more valuable as other means of judging reserve officers are limited. It is naturally not intended that this work should comprise the whole of the reserve officer's military training but only that part of his theoretical instruction which is carried on between his training periods, and which should complement his practical work.

For the regular officer the correspondence courses offer no exemption from promotion examinations, and except for the fact that a report of completion of a course will appear on his service record, his work is its own reward. On this account the regular officer can choose the particular work that he desires to pursue with a singleness of purpose. His case is analogous to that of a post-graduate student in a university, who has no longer the undergraduate worries about "credits" requisite for a sheepskin.

The purpose of the correspondence courses is not to replace the resident schools in the scheme of an officer's education. The following extracts are quoted from the instruction circular of the Naval War College Correspondence Course: "The President desires to emphasize that the Correspondence Course is not a substitute for the Naval War College Course. For officers

who have not attended the Naval War College the Correspondence Course should be helpful in itself and for those whose intentions are to attend one of the war college classes later it should serve as a preparation for those classes." Neither should our correspondence courses be considered as a substitute for resident courses in the Marine Officers' School. They do take up in general the same subjects and parallel those courses as far as they can. For a reserve officer they are the best substitute that he can get, but the resident schools have advantages such as adequate time and personal contact that the correspondence courses cannot overcome.

If the regular officer has any interest in this subject his first question is, "Is it worth while for me to enrol?" It so happens that in one or two organizations he is required to enrol, so in that case he does not need to go into that question. For the other officers there is first the question of the time he has available for study. In the Infantry Company Officers' Course there are 105 lessons and examinations. To complete this course in two school years will require an average rate of better than two lessons each week. Although this is one of the longest courses, all of them require a real amount of work. While the usual duty allows time if an officer desires to devote it to study, sometimes this is not the case. A young officer who has both the bookkeeping and language courses to complete in a limited time would certainly not have opportunity to make much headway in another course. Naturally such conditions are only temporary.

The question eventually becomes "Is professional study worth while?" An officer can expect two or possibly three years in a resident school but only that much time in the usual career is not enough to keep informed on vital military subjects or even to keep the mind plastic. A doctor or lawyer who does not study after beginning his practice cannot hope to keep up with his profession. That this is equally true of the military profession most every officer will agree. For this outside professional study the correspondence courses are particularly well adapted. They take up the subjects most worthy of professional study. They systematize this study by furnishing specific tasks and grouping those tasks in logical sequence. They give the student the benefit of advice and criticism. One advantage that all correspondence schools have is that they require every student to recite upon the entire lesson and to reduce that lesson to writing where every error is apparent. He does not miss any lesson. He is not held back by the slower student nor is he rushed over a difficult subject faster than he desires.

Furthermore, these courses use a method of instruction which is designed to give better results than unguided individual study. It has long been generally recognized that educational methods should differ in the several educational fields. The youthful mind is acquisitive and relies mainly upon memory, the mature mind is reflective and relies more upon reason. Therefore the memory system is suitable for elementary education and the applicatory method is considered better suited for adults. The latter is the one used in the so-called case system of studying law and is the one used in these courses. Reading a law book or such a text as the *Field Service Regulations*



is not only dry reading, but less profitable than the same time spent on the study of a case or problem based upon the principles therein contained.

The real and ever-present trouble with correspondence instruction is a trait of character, procrastination. However that same trait prevented Captain X from carrying out the plan he had in mind of studying the *Army Training Regulations* since the day when he first received them and was intrigued by the illustrations. Captain X after enrolling in the correspondence courses may discover the significance of those illustrations or he may not, but he has a better chance than if he had not enrolled. Looked at in one way, the work incident and because of these courses represents in the main work which would not be done otherwise. Not all the officers who enrol will complete the course, some will not submit a single paper. If the student completes one subcourse and postpones his work awaiting a stronger urge, it should not be judged that the schools in his case have failed. His work has in fact been a distinct gain however slight. It is also probable that he will have a better appreciation of the deficiencies of his military education.

There is an additional field of opportunity for the correspondence courses in their use in the conduct of garrison schools. At this time several methods have been reported. In one organization all officers were required to enrol in the basic course of the arm and to work out a lesson each week during a period provided on the schedule for the purpose. A qualified officer was detailed as instructor for each subcourse. The duties of this instructor included a general discussion of the principles of the problem for the week. When the papers were returned the instructor answered questions which might come up and where necessary clarified the comments. It so happened that mail guard duty intervened to interrupt the garrison training of this organization and plans could not be followed out. There are many possibilities in this line and the school will be glad to coöperate by varying its administrative routine better to meet the requirements of the particular situation. It is believed, however, that compulsory enrolment should be accompanied by some plan of scheduled work, such plan to include one or more periods set aside on the weekly schedule and some supervision of the work done.

A few words concerning the expense of the courses may not be amiss. The school received the following letter from one of the officers enrolled: "Due to the excessive expenses involved in procuring the necessary text-books which are required in the . . . course, I request that I be disenrolled." In that particular course the list price of the text-books required, excepting the *Army Training Regulations*, is \$1.60. All of the expenses incident to that course, including text-books, maps and equipment, are not more than \$5.00. From this letter and from various remarks which have filtered back to the school, it appears that there is much misunderstanding regarding the cost. Not considering for the moment the Command and General Staff Course, the cost of the various courses varies between one and six dollars, averaging about four dollars. This includes everything connected with the course, text-books, material and maps, excepting those text-books which are furnished to officers without charge, such as the *Army Training Regulations*, *Field*



*Service Regulations*, etc. The text-books which must be purchased are generally those which might well be in the possession of an officer whether or not he were taking the course. There is no charge for the lesson papers themselves nor for mailing. In the Command and General Staff Course there is a total charge of three dollars for the lessons or about one dollar for each year. The cost for text-books, maps and material amounts to about \$22.00, but this is spread over about three years, during which the student is working. This is more than will actually be spent, because when the student is ready to take up this course he will have acquired a considerable part of the books and other necessities.

Few realize the rapid growth of the correspondence schools in this country. Studies made under the Carnegie Corporation and reported by Mr. John S. Noffsinger have determined that nearly two millions of students were being instructed by correspondence in the proprietary schools alone. To quote Mr. Noffsinger "four times as many persons were (in 1925) studying by correspondence with privately owned schools as there were in all the resident colleges, universities and professional schools combined. This does not include the correspondence work offered by the Universities or the courses offered to the officers and enlisted men in the United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps." These figures are the more noteworthy when we consider that this has been a development in less than forty years, and that prior to 1890 only one or two small and unsuccessful attempts at instruction by correspondence had ever been made. The growth of correspondence instruction was largely in spite of the entrenched conservatism of the established educational institutions.

In considering these imposing figures one must bear in mind that a large part of the correspondence instruction offered by privately owned schools is pure bunk. It is a money-making proposition, often more or less fraudulent, and designed to catch the yokelry both urban and rural. The extravagant claims of some schools have tended to cast disrepute upon the whole system. The following quotation is from a very interesting article on the subject which appeared in the *American Mercury* (August, 1925), by Mr. George A. Scott. Mr. Scott spent some years on the sales force of such an institution. "In the case of the school with which I was associated less than three per cent. of the hopeful dupes ever completed the course. Less than half ever received the first ten lessons. It was quite generally admitted by the officials that if fifty per cent. of the students completed their courses the school would have to go out of business. All plans were laid on the definite expectation that at least ninety-five per cent. of the students would fail to finish the work. In fact, the courses were planned with this object in view. The first three or four lessons were made easy in order to keep up the interest until the second payment had been made. But the next lesson is so far above the ability of the average student or else so uninteresting that only the most determined ever go any further." This is a type of school only too common in this field. On the other hand, it represents only one class of school, some of the privately owned schools being honorably and ably conducted and

obtaining excellent results. There are also hundreds of thousand of students enrolled in the correspondence branches of such universities as Columbia, Chicago and Cornell. The records of the reputable schools have not only demonstrated that instruction by correspondence, under proper conditions, is entirely feasible, but it has been noted that in some of the universities the work of the non-resident student was superior to that done in the classroom. There can be no question but that to-day instruction by correspondence is one of the important educational agencies of the country. There is also every reason to believe that this method will be one of increasing importance in the military education of the officers of the service.

It is interesting to report what the response has been since the correspondence courses were offered to the Marine Corps. Up to the end of the first quarter in December, 243 students had enrolled. Prior to that date nineteen had voluntarily disenrolled. This represented those who had left the service and those who were ordered on other duty such as schools, where they did not anticipate time to continue work. Generally the officer disenrolling expressed the intention of taking up the work upon favorable opportunity later. A total of thirty-two officers were disenrolled because they failed to meet the requirement of submitting one lesson during the first period. Our mortality then during this first period was fourteen per cent. The majority of those who failed to meet the first requirement were officers who had been ordered on mail guard duty before they had assembled their equipment and where there was probably little opportunity for study. It is also to be noted that the first lesson is the hardest, like taking the first plunge. Once the student has his gear collected and once started to work, the second and remaining lessons seem to come along with less resistance. The colleges and universities of the country lose about thirty per cent. of those who enter by the end of the first year; compared with that our mortality rate has not been excessive. Since December 1st, the new enrolments more than made up for the losses and there are now, early in February, 233 students on the active files. Of these, 110 are reserve officers, which means that one-third of the officers of the reserve are actively enrolled. This percentage will no doubt be increased as the result of the new requirements for promotion in that branch. The enrolment records indicate a response from the service as favorable as could have been expected and it is a pleasure to report that the majority of the active students are making very creditable progress.

## PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION

BY MAJOR ROBERT W. VOETH, U.S.M.C.

**A**S DEFINED by Webster, principle is source or origin, that from which anything proceeds and in that light principles of organization will involve definition and distribution of authority and responsibility, including the necessary distinctions between planning and execution, and between general matters and details. It will aim at the adjustment of capacity to function and the establishment of control through standards, sequences and schedules with individualized orders and records, of tasks and rewards. The fulfilment of the various steps stated produces an organization coördinated to mutual functioning and provides a medium for the decentralization of effort and authority. Concisely stated the three principles of organization are first, definiteness of plan of organization, second, clear definition of duties of men and departments, and third, definite limits of authority and responsibility of each individual.

An organization is created for the purpose of attaining certain desired results in the shortest possible time and at the least expense and its magnitude depends upon the size and complexity of the particular case.

There is no single correct form of organization. As a general rule any organization should be simple and flexible; easily understood; suited to the personalities involved; in scale with the enterprise; and provocative of those results which are essential to success. Production is the final test of all organizations.

Elaborating upon the principle of "definition and distribution of authority and responsibility," it is to be noted that in the organization an unbroken line of authority extends downward to the person ultimately responsible for each act, while a similar line of responsibility reaches upward in the opposite direction. The exact authority and responsibility for an act must be defined for each person or position, and there should be no omissions, overlapping or duplication of such assignments. Equitable assignment of duty is desirable and that assignment in proportion to the capacity of the individual to function. Each individual should clearly identify his position in the organization with its attendant duties, powers, limitations and liaisons, and these assignments should be stabilized. Orders and reports should issue as in the military hierarchy. The ratio of the numerical distribution above referred to varies from 1:5 to 1:25, the former ratio being preferable in the higher capacities and the latter in the lower.

### PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Planning should precede execution and exemplifies both the principle of division of labor and coördination of effort. Effort so expended should be returned many fold in the execution. Planning is a form of initiative. Those assigned to the preparation of plans should be charged with their execution,

this in accordance with the policy of taking the initiative in the execution of plans, for only that can be specifically planned for which one is to initiate oneself. The outstanding example of this principle is that of the Prussian plan for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, which, upon declaration of war, needed only the Royal Signature to vitalize its being.

#### GENERAL MATTERS AND DETAILS

Any work which prevents an officer from performing the highest class of functions assigned to him, in the best manner, is detail work, and in the interest of the efficiency of the whole organization should be subordinated. The limits of "detail" are in direct relation to the rank of the individual concerned. The importance of this principle is emphasized and recognized in the "two-plane" plan of organization. A distinct line of demarcation delimits the creative plane from the routine plane in various positions of this type of organization.

#### CONTROL THROUGH STANDARDS, SEQUENCES, SCHEDULES, ETC.

The functions of control are fundamentally the same in all businesses, but the problem of control varies with the different types thereof. Control includes the establishment of policies, the planning and setting up of the organization which is to carry out these policies, and the operation or running of the organization. Through the agency of standards, sequences, schedules, graphs, and agencies of supervision, such as accounting systems, inspection systems, reports and recording methods, the most intimate details of the operation of the organization are brought to light.

#### ORDERS AND INCENTIVES

Organizational activity, *i.e.*, operations, should be in response to orders which should be relatively few in number, clear, brief, but complete, prompt, in professional form, of proper tone, confined within legitimate scope and adequately documented.

Prompt reward should follow the accompaniment of a task. By this means management is able to signify its measure of depreciation or appreciation.

Operation is the final organic function of manufacturing. Operations are divided into two classes, external and internal, the ramifications of the former being less well defined than the latter, which latter is generally divided into production, distribution, and administration. All the sciences and the technical professions contribute to the operations of industry.

The principles of operation are first the principle of "division of labor." This is defined as meaning the subdivision of labor, both mental and manual, into its ultimate or more fundamental components. The application of this principle is widespread and its advantages numerous. Dexterity and production are increased and skill conserved. Adaptation of the worker to his occupation, made possible through this principle, is of vast economic impor-



tance. Under this principle planning precedes production. The application of this principle is at times limited by the magnitude of production.

The second principle is "transfer of skill." This consists essentially in the use, by an inferior workman, of a mechanical device which has been endowed with a portion of a superior workman's skill by the application of the superior's art. All machines do not exemplify the principle of transfer of skill. Those that do fall under the class of "time-saving machines" but from this class must be differentiated the class known as "labor-saving machinery" as typified by steam or gas engines. Semi-automatic machines inherently possess an application of this principle but require some human effort in their operation. Mechanical accuracy and interchangeability are effected by transfer of skill. Division of labor is accomplished by coördination of effort.

The third principle is "transfer of thought." This principle parallels the previous principle, that of "transfer of skill," differing only in that "thought" not "skill," is the subjective. When the transfer of thought and skill to a machine is so complete as not to require the intervention of any human agency in its immediate operation, it is known as full automatic. Magnitude of production imposes a limitation similar to that of the division of labor.

The fourth principle is the laws of increasing and decreasing productivity. The law of increasing productivity is the relation between improved tools and productive costs. This relation is expressed by the statement that "unit cost is in general in inverse ratio to the quantity of production." There is, however, a limit to the application of this principle and at that limit the law of diminishing productivity governs. Under this law unit costs are in direct relation to the quantity of production. This principle is applicable to both labor and capital. Magnitude of production imposes a limitation of the application of this principle as outlined in the principle of the division of labor.

The fifth principle is coördination of effort. The supplement of this principle is that of the division of labor. Coördination is effected by organization diagrams, written instructions, reports and administrative committees and, together with division of labor, smacks largely of what is known as scientific management.

The sixth principle is specialization. Specialization of the individual increases quality and quantity of his product. This applies as well to enterprises as to individuals. The most notable exemplification of this principle is the machine tool industry. Overspecialization produces integration, the reverse of this principle. Specialization enjoys the advantages of division of labor, viz., better and cheaper product. Disadvantages are intermittent operation during economic depressions and possible obsolescence of product.

The seventh principle is standardization. Standardization is the reduction of the types and sizes of a product to a fixed minimum. This principle is of the greatest economic value and has given rise to that most desirable feature, interchangeability. The advantages of standardization are many and varied while the only disadvantage noted is to impede progress on account of inflexi-



bility. The classic examples cited typifying this disadvantage are our reluctance to adopt the metric system of weights and measures and Great Britain's similar attitude regarding a shift of her monetary system.

#### TYPES OF ORGANIZATION

**Line or military organization:** This form is based on the organization of the command element of an Army and is a simple mathematical subordination of personnel based on various desirable ratios. Direct vertical lines of authority drop to the ultimate operative and corresponding lines of responsibility follow the same paths in returning. Advantages are simplicity, clear definition of duties and responsibility, and ease of securing discipline. Disadvantages, efficiency subordinated to discipline, rigidity and inflexibility, not adaptable to large or complex undertakings, inequitable distribution of duties and responsibilities, tendency to perpetuate inefficient methods, undue reliance upon the skill and personal knowledge of the operative, danger of disaster if a strong head is lost.

**Staff or functional organization:** This form of organization is a division according to functions. Mental and manual work is subdivided and deputized to the subordinate operations. Staff functions are coördinate and coöperative, holding no relative valuation or prerogatives between themselves. The responsibilities of the individual are limited to one function throughout the organization. Lines of authority radiate from each and every superior to each and every subordinate in the descending scale of the organization and corresponding lines of responsibility are reflected along the same courses in returning. Advantages: Separation of mental and manual labor according to functions to be performed, maximum of expert advice and direction, minimum of functions assigned to one person, tendency toward high individual efficiency. Disadvantages: Weak discipline, difficulty of coöordinating many separate functions, tendency to produce narrow specialists among the executives and automatons among the operatives.

**Line and staff organization:** This form combines the features of both the line and staff types. Industry discloses no pure example of either the line or the staff type of organization, the predominate type being a combination of the two under the subject type. The line element is essential to discipline and continuity and the staff elements to efficiency. A line organization is strong in dealing with routine matters but weak in the face of emergency requiring the expert functional guidance and advice of the staff in such cases. Advantages are a combination of the advantages of the line and the staff types. Disadvantages are the disadvantages of those types minimized.

**Committee organization:** This type of organization is a modification of the line and staff type where the advisory functions are exercised by committees. Overloaded executives utilize this modification in arriving at their decisions, and coördination and correlation are effected. Through such committees acquaintance is promoted and a friendly tolerant attitude in negotiation is maintained. Business matters are quickly presented and

adjusted. The committee system can be applied to any level in an organization. Advantages: Adaptability, flexibility, expedition, concentration of knowledge and experience (in addition to the advantages of the line and staff type), impersonal in its action, action based on facts presented, pettiness and personal prejudice cast aside. Disadvantage: Danger of domination by strong character.

#### UNIT SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION

A few remarks anent the unit system of organization may not be amiss. Its proponent, an eminent scholar of the science of organization, successfully applied the system to the Harriman lines of railroads, with such a marked degree of success as to leave but little doubt to its efficacy.

The unit system, particularly applicable to far-flung operations, appears to be an application of the military principle of succession of command to any official and his immediate subordinates in a line and staff type of organization. Staff elements of the organization are, for the purpose of operation, vested with line functions in the absence of the next higher official. This in addition to his functional duties ordinarily exercised. The advantages of this modification are that, in the absence of the superior official, there is always a responsible official left "on the lid," acting over his own signature as a line or operative officer, and any tendency to government by "chief clerks" is eliminated. Disadvantages: Violation, in some degree, of the principles of organization, viz., as to definiteness of organization, confusion of duties and definition of authority and responsibility in general. The disadvantages of staff organization are somewhat increased by injection of the variable into the organization.

#### DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CONTROL AND OPERATION

In any commercial undertaking control is the great coördinator, and is necessary in some degree in all such activities, the degree varying in accordance with various factors of the individual case. Organization for control and organization for operation are intimately intertwined within the organization itself. The process of control will function within the very substance of the operative structure. Control includes first, establishment of policies, second, planning and setting up of a suitable organization, and third, the operation of that organization, and is effected through various classes of aids.

The organization for both control and operation is the organization itself, the contained control organization organized as and functioning through the staff element and the operative organization being and functioning through the line element.

The principles of organization, operation, and control as practiced by commercial organizations, have been rather closely followed by the War Department set up for War Procurement. There are, however, a few violations of the principles that should be noted.

The set up of the office of the Director of Procurement for War should contain a planning subdivision. Even though the set-up presupposes translation from a pure planning agency to an operating agency, there is every

good reason to believe that a planning unit should be provided to function during such emergency. It is not to be presumed that planning is complete upon the outbreak of war. Every excellent plan of organization contemplates a division between the planning or creative plane and the operating or routine plane and this differentiation serves as the basis of the type named as the two-plane plan of organization. This omission is a departure from both the principles of organization and operation.

The commodity in trade produced by the War Department Procurement set up in time of peace is plans for industrial preparedness for war. Operation is the true test of all organization and this function is being fulfilled daily. However, opportunity for the acid test of this set-up comes very infrequently. If and when such occasion arises, it is found that the organization has fulfilled the purpose for which intended, it may be said that it pays a dividend to its stockholders, the people.

Good business recognizes that there is a limit to the operations of any one office and when that limit is reached decentralization is the order of the day, *i.e.*, decentralization of activities but not of control. This parallels the War Department Procurement set-up with its centralized control and decentralized operations. However, in an organization of far-flung activities, narrow specialization is prevented by the injection of a high degree of teamwork or coördination. Decentralized operations and the placing of authority and responsibility close to the job itself results in a great number of supervisory positions. This practice, an approved principle of commercial practice, might well be applied to the activities of the various services in the procurement districts. Theory and good practice would dictate that delegated authority and limited responsibility be placed close to the operating agencies in the various districts and that these operations be coördinated locally insofar as this practice would not interfere with the progress of the whole.

## THE PERILS OF PUBLICITY

BY CAPTAIN J. H. PLATT, U.S.M.C.

**M**Y DICTIONARY defines publicity as "The state of being public or open to common knowledge; exposure to the view or knowledge of the public; notoriety; opposed to secrecy."

The lexicographer who wrote this definition evidently held opinions widely varying from those cherished by certain marine officers who have described this "state of being" to me. Because what is written here must be transported through the mails it is unsafe to set down their salty comments in any other form than this ——!!! ——!!!

The foregoing paragraph was written without humorous intent. It is a plain statement of facts. In any barracks, in any officers' mess, the mere mention of the word "publicity" will arouse expressions of anger and disgust . . . unless there be present someone of high rank before whom his juniors must maintain a seemly reticence.

I am never surprised by these outbursts. I understand them. Years ago I once joined such a chorus of indignation myself.

It came about this way. One night during the war a number of marine officers were lounging in their quarters in a training area. Word had seeped through from the front that the marines had gone in and had done a creditable job. Not much was said about it at the time, but from remarks dropped by one and another, it was easy to see that they felt that nothing could ever tarnish the record our men had made.

Then someone broke out a newspaper sent to him from the States. It was old but it bristled with news from home and they were happy—happy until they saw a certain picture.

This picture showed a woman wearing a marine cap and a caricature of a Marine Corps blouse with the same chevrons that real men had worked for years to earn. With her were two marines of whom little need be noted here, save that one of them needed a hair-cut and the other wore his cap on the back of his head the better to display his pretty curls. The caption above this work of art described it as Miss Somebody-or-Other, the famous musical comedy star, receiving an honorary warrant as a non-commissioned officer in the Marine Corps, "the heroes of the war."

The thing seemed to defile our best traditions. Yet it was no more than a mistake made by men who lacked good taste and judgment. Their intent was harmless. Nevertheless had they entered that billet that night, violent words would surely have been followed by rough deeds.

The depressing effect upon the men in the field of this "publicity stunt" and of others that came later cannot be exaggerated. Perhaps we were too sensitive, but I only know how we felt about it. From that day on publicity was a pariah-word among us, a term of reproach and a curse.

Even now, after the years have mellowed my own judgment and reduced



my prejudice, the mere utterance of the word "publicity" arouses within me a faint feeling of nausea which no amount of reasoning will banish. I know more about publicity now. I know that it is useful when employed with dignity and restraint. But I shall never again enjoy the sound of the word itself, and I shall always have a certain sympathy with those who are blindly prejudiced against it. I know "how they got that way."

Some of us will always cast wistful glances back toward the time when the cloak of modesty covered all our activities. The fine reticence which characterized the old professional soldier seems to have been lost in the clamor of this age of bally-hoo, and with it went something of his dignity. But vain regrets are a waste of time. Those who would hold our line against further encroachments by the votaries of the Great God Bunk must face the front, not the rear. They must consider the situation that exists to-day.

Publicity is apparently a necessary evil. In one form or another it will always haunt us. We cannot ignore its presence. We might sever all relations with the newspapers, shut down our little printing plant and muzzle all recruiters; and still the Corps would be subjected to publicity, "the state of being public or open to common knowledge." The press would continue to print news of the Marine Corps, photographers would take pictures, and citizens would spread their opinions—good or bad—by word-of-mouth. We should lose whatever slight control we now have over this force, but the force itself would continue to operate in spite of us.

If we cannot abolish publicity and recover our lost privacy, we can at least try to understand it and avoid its perils.

At its worst publicity is the cunning art of putting one's best foot forward—and lying about the foot. At its best publicity is the science of so governing one's public relations that the average citizen will have no reason to think of one with anything but the deepest respect.

Marine publicity, in the hands of the undisciplined amateur, is as dangerous as T.N.T. With a "stick" of type he can wreck our dignity as quickly as a drunkard with a stick of dynamite could wreck a china shop.

To illustrate this point, let us glance at a case which was brought to the attention of the writer some years ago. A certain recruiter had his picture printed in the papers on many occasions by the simple expedient of posing for photographers shaking hands with movie stars. About every ten days there he was in half-tone with another celebrity of the screen. Apparently his conception of his duty was to "get something in the papers," and he took the easiest way to a rather doubtful fame.

The object of his activities was undoubtedly to obtain advertising that would tempt young men to enlist in the Marine Corps. Just why he thought such pictures would accomplish this I fail to see. My own experience with recruits leads me to believe that even the dumbest of them are too keen to think that shaking hands with movie stars is one of the normal activities of a marine.

Such pictures are a waste of time or worse. They fool no "prospects,"



add nothing to the dignity of the uniform, and may well arouse a dangerous public reaction.

If I were a civilian taxpayer, this is the thought such pictures would develop in my mind: "I pay the taxes that pay that fellow's salary, and he is paid to raise and train troops to defend my country. Why doesn't he stick to his job? Why does he waste Uncle Sam's time fooling around a moving picture studio?"

If I were a Congressman controlling appropriations for national defence, I might easily reach the conclusion, or at least the suspicion, that some proportion of these funds, however small, was not being expended for the best interests of the nation.

This incident illustrates one of the worst perils of publicity. It is the danger that lies in wait for those who choose the easy paths toward newspaper notoriety. There are certain types of pictures that newspapers will always print. One of these is the picture of a good-looking woman. Pose her in a revealing attitude and every "tabloid" in the country will give space to the result. Pose a marine with her, and you will have what some among us seem to regard as "good publicity." If you posed her with a convict in his stripes, it would be just as widely published.

What is the net result of such examples of bad taste?

The answer is that the newspaper has gained one more snappy picture, the lady's press agent has won some valuable advertising; but what has the Marine Corps gained? A few sneers, perhaps—nothing more.

Another peril of publicity is the exaggeration of its importance. It is a sad fact that the public can frequently be fooled by a clever press agent. In civil life the keen observer can discover many men whose inflated reputations are sustained by nothing more than the vapor of much advertising. But in the military service, when we begin to measure things by the yardstick of newspaper space, we are putting our best ideals in jeopardy. Too much publicity may easily turn our heads and make us think we are as good as we are painted in the press.

In the old western mining towns some strange twist of civic pride used to inspire men to build their houses with false fronts. From the street these structures appeared to have two stories, but in rear of these facades were nothing but one-floor shacks. The exaggeration of publicity may easily develop a warped mental attitude which will lead us to believe that a false front of advertising can hide all our shortcomings.

Laboring under this delusion we will plant a picture of one well-drilled company in the newspapers and think that we have safely hidden three poorly drilled outfits that exist in the vicinity. Why work hard on the poor companies when we can make the public believe that they, too, are good? Such thoughts lead only to negligence and inefficiency. And while we are smiling over our cleverness someone will surely sneak into our back yard and see the rear of our false front.

On the other hand, if we build our structure honestly, we need not worry about publicity. The public may walk all around us and see nothing that

is not good. But the building of a two-story house demands twice as much work as the rearing of a false front.

False front publicity has always been the refuge of the lazy man. It may help him for a time, but in the end it ruins him, both in character and reputation.

False front publicity will not turn dirty marines into clean marines, or bad marines into good ones. The erection of a military structure that is above public criticism demands hard work all along the line. Publicity has little to do with it, but good publicity will be the inevitable result if the work is well done.

To describe all the evils of unwise publicity would consume more space than can be given to the subject here. It is a depressing task at best. It is high time we turned our attention to the correct employment of this dangerous but sometimes useful force.

There are in the Marine Corps only a few men who by training, education and temperament are fitted for successful publicity work without supervision. But these men cannot spend all of their time in publicity activities. There is soldiering to be done, and they prefer to do it or they would not remain in the Corps. Of necessity, then, publicity work must frequently be turned over to amateurs. Our problem is so to arrange matters that they cannot harm our reputation through their ignorance. In other words, they must be brought under efficient control. They must be made to understand what they *must not* do.

This result can be accomplished only by developing a definite publicity policy. We have policies to govern all of our other activities. Why should we not have a policy which could be applied to all activities involving publicity of any sort?

Too many of us regard publicity as the trick of inserting stories and pictures in the newspapers. It is much more than this, but while we continue to mouth the word "publicity," this misconception of its meaning will never be dispelled. Why not jettison the word once and for all?

Public relations is a better term which has no evil past to live down. Most marine officers will deny that they have any interest in publicity, but there are few who are not interested in the public relations of the Corps or have no regard for the opinion of the general public.

Every commanding officer of a barracks, however small it may be, wants his men to make a good impression on the citizens of the vicinity. It would be easy to make such officers understand that public relations is a term covering not only what the press prints about the Corps, but what the public sees and hears of its members.

No conscientious officer, bearing public relations in mind, could ever be guilty of allowing a poorly uniformed marine to go on liberty from his barracks. He could not condone any neglect that might bring public discredit upon his unit or himself. Bring home to such a man the idea that he is responsible for public relations in his vicinity, and all of his activities will be colored by the thought that the public reputation of the Corps is in his

keeping, that no newspaper story, no picture, no sidewalk gossip, should ever be allowed to cloud it.

Among recruiters, whose public relations are maintained more often through the press and other forms of advertising, the use of the new term might well work wonders. It would certainly give them a finer conception of those activities which have heretofore been classed as publicity.

A definite public relations policy, broader in scope than the old, worn-out "publicity," would serve as a guide for all officers in all their relations with civilians, whether newspaper men or others. But such a policy can be formulated only after careful study. It involves almost every activity of the Corps. It must be comprehensive, yet dignified, and so in tune with our best traditions as to win the support of all who wear our uniform.

Such a policy, I sincerely believe, would forever banish the danger of public humiliation and silence those, who, like myself, detest the sound of the word "publicity."

However, nomenclature is not all-important. The mere changing of a word will not reform a warped psychology. Loyalty to high ideals, modesty, dignity—good taste—these must rule our public relations; or the term itself will mean nothing.

## THE BATTLE OF THE BENNING PLAIN

BY CAPTAIN ELBRIDGE COLBY, U. S. ARMY

**D**OWN he dropped in a heap, and got first aid from a comrade, and expired on the field of honor, and his tin hat was hoisted on rifle butt as bayonet pierced the ground and held the headgear aloft in token of a departed soldier. But he surprised the spectators by getting up later and walking away.

Across the folds of Maxey Ridge came a doughboy with determined tread, rifle at the ready, driving before him two Heinie's in feldgrau, with German helmets and everything. But the moment they got out of sight, uplifted hands went down and all three crouched to light a cigarette together. Even the third light from the same match was safe, for it was only the Battle Demonstration, and both of these incidents were put in to add touches of realism, although nothing could have been more realistic than the way "Dutch" Smythe, of West Point football fame, flashed across the turf with touchdown speed, flopped to sudden inconspicuousness, and was presently up and moving forward again like the streak that he is; or the way in which the bursting shrapnel from the Eighty-third left flame and smoke puffs in the air and dusted perfect ellipses on the rounded forward slope of Rivet Ridge.

There was little to strain the imagination. The yearly grand show of the doughboy training centre was real. Student officers of all ranks and from all components of the army have thus annually an opportunity to see offensive combat as it is actually staged with live ammunition in accordance with post-war doctrines and principles. Civilians also attend in large numbers from neighboring communities, counties, and states, and also special visitors from Washington and other posts of the army. But it is for the students and for serious training purposes that the show is given. Similar to actual conflict in every respect save only for certain peace-time precautions to obviate danger to soldiers and spectators. Spectacular, tactically correct, and noisy with the hum of airplane, the whirr of shrapnel, the thunder of bombs, the rattle of musketry, and the crack of one pounders. Only the enemy is imaginary. This is a "battle demonstration" and not a sham battle in the old sense of that term. It is true that some of the positions of the supporting weapons are not quite according to Hoyle. It is true that there is no overhead fire, as there used to be in the Kelley Problem against Riley Ridge. Major C. P. Hall, in charge of the affair, had to place his supporting weapons where their fire would be absolutely safe for spectators and for participants. In war, journalists have to take their chances. On campaign, troopers must run the risk of becoming casualties, from their own as well as from enemy guns. On Rivet Ridge they have to be protected. But except for this, and except for the complete absence of an enemy, the operation was real as well as realistic. Otherwise the battle was to the life.

The ancient Chattahoochee River which runs "down from the hills of



Habersham and out of the valleys of Hall" is once more the boundary line between hostile nations. The invading forces have pushed across the waterway pressing ever eastwards, and have obtained a substantial foothold on the levels and wooded clusters of the Benning Plain. Before them they have driven the hated red foes, who now stretch in a jagged line along the edge of the rising ground which runs from Riche Hill and its station hospital and bends generally southeast into the heart of the forested reservation. The time has come to thrust forward with all available arms and on an extended front. At four-fifteen in the morning (problem time) just as dawn drives the gray shadows from the fields, the attack will start.

Along the Lumpkin Road, awaiting the word to go, lie the Demonstration Doughboys of the 29th Infantry, the famous first battalion, with imaginary supporting troops on their right and left. The Division Commander has issued his order for the attack. At seven-thirty last evening the lieutenant colonel had completed his reconnaissance and preparations and had given out his attack order for the First Bats of the "Lead the Way" regiment, of which the following are extracts:

1. a. A Red force, estimated as a reënforced brigade, opposes our invasion of Red territory; it holds the line: RICHE HILL—MAXEY RIDGE—BOIS D'ORMONT—REDWOOD HILL—SEXTON RIDGE. In our front the enemy has organized combat posts on the southern slope of MAXEY RIDGE, and on RIVET RIDGE; machine guns have been located at (17.1-18.5) and at (17.0-18.2). Enemy activity has been noted on BOUTON HILL and on SMITH HILL.

b. Our division attacks at 4.15 A.M. to-morrow, and penetrates the Red Position in the direction: 9TH INFANTRY WOODS—LAMBERT HILL. [Not on extract map.] Our 1st Brigade, on the left of the division, attacks with regiments abreast, 29th Infantry on the right. Our regiment attacks in column of battalions, 1st Battalion in assault, and makes the penetration. The 1st Battalion, 1st Field Artillery, from positions in the vicinity of RICHARDS HILL [not on extract map], supports our battalion by a preparation and successive concentrations. A thirty-minute intensive bombardment will be placed on enemy front lines from 3.45 A.M. to 4.15 A.M., particular attention being paid to enemy organization on MAXEY and RIVET RIDGES, enemy observation on RIVET RIDGE will be blinded by smoke from 4.15 A.M. to 4.25 A.M. Companies H and M from positions [not on extract map] support the attack by fire on the southern slope of MAXEY RIDGE and on RIVET RIDGE, in that order of importance, until their fire is masked. The Howitzer Company 1st Infantry less 1st Platoon, from positions in the draw [not on extract map], supports the attack by fire on the machine guns at (17.1-18.5), and upon the 4TH INFANTRY WOODS. The 1st Battalion 4th Infantry is on our right, and assists our advance by the capture of SMITH HILL. The 2d Battalion 2d Infantry is on our left, and assists our advance on call after passing MAXEY RIDGE.

2. This battalion, with the 1st Platoon Howitzer Company attached, moving into position to-night, will attack by 4.15 A.M. to-morrow and penetrate the hostile position in the direction 9TH INFANTRY WOODS—LAMBERT HILL. Making its main effort with its right, it will capture the southern slopes of MAXEY RIDGE, RIVET RIDGE, and BOUTON HILL, then continue the advance on LAMBERT HILL.

Formation: Companies A and B in assault, Company A on the right; Company C in reserve.

Line of departure: LUMPKIN ROAD.

Direction of attack: 80 degrees magnetic azimuth.




Right boundary: Zone of action: BM—site of old house on LUMPKIN ROAD at (17.05-17.8)—point 200 yards south of crest of ELLIOT HILL—RJ 200 yards east of BM 49—cross-roads at (21.90-18.95). (All inclusive.)

Left boundary: RJ at (14.85-18.05)—site of old house on LUMPKIN ROAD at (16.6-18.5)—north edge of 4TH INFANTRY WOODS—road bend at (18.6-19.0)—BM 50 (all inclusive).

3. a. Company A will attack on a 300-yard front, with its right on the battalion right boundary. It will drive hard to the front, overrun the hostile front line north of the BOIS D'ORMONT, and, assisted by the flanking action of Company B, capture that part of RIVET RIDGE south of the 4TH INFANTRY WOODS. It will then capture ELLIOT HILL and drive the enemy east of the KEYSTONE ROAD.

b. Company B will attack on a 350-yard front with its left resting on the battalion



INFANTRY BATTALION IN ATTACK

SITUATION AT ZERO HOUR. NUMBERED GRID LINES 1,000 YARDS APART. POSITION OF MACHINE GUNS, ARTILLERY, ONE FOUNDERS, AND TRENCH MORTARS ARE NOT SHOWN ON THIS MAP.

left boundary. It will capture the hostile main line of resistance on MAXEY RIDGE, then push on and capture the 4TH INFANTRY WOODS and BOUTON HILL, and drive the enemy east of the KEYSTONE ROAD. This company will assist Company A in the capture of that part of RIVET RIDGE south of the 4TH INFANTRY WOODS by flanking action from those woods.

c. Company D, from initial positions on the LUMPKIN ROAD with the right of the gun positions at a point 100 yards northwest of the road junction [not on extract map] at (16.95-17.95), and on a front of 150 yards, will support the attacks by fire on enemy targets on the southern slopes of MAXEY RIDGE and RIVET RIDGE. It will pay particular attention to supporting the advance of Company A.

d. The 1st Platoon Howitzer Company, from initial positions [not shown on extract map], will support the attack, paying particular attention to the hostile machine guns on RIVET RIDGE, and that portion of the scrub pines on the southwestern slope of MAXEY RIDGE in Company B's zone of action.

e. Company C, in battalion reserve, will take station in the woods at (16.5-17.9) and

await orders. It will detail connecting groups of one squad each to maintain connection with the units on our right and left.

x. (1) \* \* \* \* \*

(2) At the beginning of the attack, a gap of 150 yards will be maintained between adjacent flanks of assault companies for the execution of machine gun fire.

\* \* \* \* \*

For half an hour the seventy-fives have been pouring shrapnel onto the dusty slopes of Maxey Ridge and Rivet Ridge, and it is four-fifteen to the second when fighting foot sloggers begin to press eastward from the Lumpkin Road. At the same instant the staccato beat of machine guns gives evidence that the supporting fire is being maintained. For ten minutes, the forward groups press on toward Maxey Ridge and Rivet Ridge, which are now densely shrouded in clouds of smoke which blinds the eyes and limits the watchful vision of hostile firers. The battle is well launched, ready for that man-to-man phase which will decide the issue. The assault waves are temporarily checked by a heavy enemy fire. On the right Company A shows that its platoon leaders appreciate the manœuvre principle governing employment of their units. The right assault platoon swings its support section under cover of the draw south-east of Maxey Ridge to fire on enemy groups on Rivet Ridge. The left assault platoon advances a few men to arch rifle grenades against the foeman's groups on Maxey Ridge. On the left Company B also resorts to manœuvre, going into the woods on the left of the battalion zone of action by infiltration, and the support section of its left platoon finds a gap on the left and fires from the flank on the enemy combat post on Maxey Ridge. All the while the one pounders have been punching straight and fast at typewriter nests on Rivet Ridge (17.9-18.2) and the trench mortars have been booming away at the 4th Infantry Woods.

Twenty-five minutes from the start of the attack the assault becomes an actuality. The right platoon of B Company crashes into Maxey Ridge as the left platoon assists in the capture of Humphreys Hill. And almost simultaneously A Company begins to drive against the southern nose of Rivet Ridge, with the manœuvred platoon, just a moment before the assault sections of A Company come to the crest of Maxey Ridge. The flanks are well advanced, and the enemy is in danger of being pinched in. The attack has progressed unevenly, but still satisfactorily.

For several moments the issue of the conflict is stationary. A yellow rocket has streaked the sky to indicate "first objective taken" as the forward companies reorganize for further advance. Up to Maxey Ridge itself comes the battalion commander, with his reconnaissance party. Bn-2 establishes an observation post. D Company's reconnaissance officer reports suitable advanced positions for the heavy Brownings. The lieutenant colonel gives his order and the machine gunners start to move forward, the first platoon coming up in carts, while the second platoon remains in position ready to resume fire.

All is getting set for further progress. Pushing through the 4th Infantry Woods, Company B prepares to close in on Rivet Ridge. Company A is

filtering up the forward slopes. The reserve company and the command post are ordered to move into the woods west of Maxey Ridge (16.9-18.5). The battalion commander has not had to use C Company yet. He has maintained control of its movements, and has wisely not committed it to action, for the manœuvre ability of his lieutenants has so far been able to keep the assault companies on the move and the enemy going backward. A sudden combined assault by Companies A and B an hour and twenty minutes after zero hour puts Rivet Ridge in the hands of the attacking forces, and another yellow smoke streak across the clouds, again says, "objective taken."

It is time to think about fighting forward once more. The support weapons are getting to be pretty far back, and the lifting hills screen their view as well as their fire. D Company is now all on Maxey Ridge, and starts forward for Rivet Ridge, dropping through the draw and slipping through the trees to fine positions on the high edge of the 4th Infantry Woods—moving, of course, only one platoon at a time. The Howitzer Platoon also commences to move on. But even while this movement is in process, in a short ten minutes, a powerful enemy counter-attack drives the assault companies westward, into the woods and back to Maxey Ridge. This is no supine and accommodating enemy, but one who will always do what will be most disadvantageous to us. This is no mere Kelley Problem, and pretty time-table show or sham battle to startle presidential eyes. This is a battle demonstration. This is a picturization of war; and in war we must expect sudden returns of the tide.

The First Platoon of the Brownings are caught on their carts and in positions unsuitable for fire; but the Second Platoon is being held back against just such an emergency. Consequently the gunners on Maxey Ridge spit their bursts of bullets upon the hostile groups visible to the front, and the foe presses toward B Company and the 4th Infantry Woods, lays a band of bullets across the face of those woods as a protective line for the fighting doughboys of the hard-pressed assault. The Howitzer weapons are also on the move, having just reached the near edge of the same woods. And they also go into action, setting up where they stand and making the fullest use of their 100 per cent. marksmanship qualification.

The battalion commander speaks. It is time to use his reserve. It is time to use the tank platoon which has just a few moments ago managed to join the outfit, after perilous experiences on pontoons across the Chattahoochee. Under cover of Maxey Ridge it deploys and goes forward with the reserve company, which—fresh for combat and as yet unwearied—has lain in a vigorous firing line and put a definite stop to the enemy counter-attack. The defense against the counter-attack will swing into a resumption of the advance. The tanks are here. They need not be held forever as final chips in the poker game of campaign. The enemy position is well known. His strength has been shown. We shall call his hand and use the tanks instead of letting them stand idle. So onward go the tankers and the C Company fighters, supported by rifle fire from A and B Companies on Maxey Ridge and 4th Infantry Woods. The combined thrust sweeps forward and Rivet

Ridge falls eventually and finally into the hands of the Demonstration Doughboys.

Student officers who have pushed pins into maps all winter and have imagined troops on terrain, and tried to visualize fire power and effective manoeuvre amid confused battlefield conditions—these student officers have actually seen a war strength battalion in action, with showers of actual bullets, and staccato beat of machine guns, and the zip of a barrage of 75's, and the sway of attack and counter-attack. Benning has displayed its "dope." Instructors of the school and troops of the "Lead the Way" regiment have demonstrated the tactics and technic which rule at the junction of the Chatahoochee and the Upatoi, and have again said, in effect, to the doughboys of the army: "Follow Me."



## SOME OBSERVATIONS OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE

BY MAJOR WILLIAM C. WISE, JR., U.S.M.C.

WHEN the editor of the GAZETTE requested the writer to contribute a summary of his observations of the Marine Corps Reserve—observations based on the point of view of a regular officer on duty “in the field” with the reserves—he was pleased to have the opportunity of presenting such a summary to the officers of the regular Corps, in the hopes that it not only would give those officers an insight into the problems which have entered in the building-up of the Reserve under the law of 1925, but would also inform the Reserve Officers who are members of the Marine Corps Association in regard to these problems.

The writer considers that he has been fortunate, in that during his service in the Corps, he has been identified with the establishment and operation of what he considers the most important preliminary steps necessary to be taken in order to prepare the Marine Corps for carrying out efficiently its ultimate mission in time of War; these two steps were the adoption of the Recruit Depot system of training and the establishment of the new Marine Corps Reserve. He well remembers the scepticism and lack of understanding on the part of the officers of the Corps in regard to the success of Recruit Depot training. Some of this lack of understanding still persists in the minds of many officers, due to their belief that a recruit, when he has been turned over for duty from the Depot, should be a “finished” soldier, whereas, as a matter of fact, the Recruit Depot, in the time available, can give him but the rudiments of his duties. It then remains for the officers of his new station to complete and perfect him in his duties and to make a real Marine out of him. This same attitude on the part of the regular officers will, in some cases, undoubtedly recur in regard to the reservists, when they first report for duty and when mobilized in time of a National Emergency, unless all of the facts concerning their appointment to the Reserve and their peacetime training are understood by us of the regular service.

It was early recognized, after assuming duty with the reserves in the Western Area that but little difficulty would be experienced in procuring applicants for reserve commissions insofar as actual numbers were concerned, due to the fact that almost any able-bodied man of any or no prior service, would accept a commission (though regardless of experience, a Captaincy was the lowest rank which was acceptable to many). The procurement of the type of man whose character, appearance, position in life and in his community, whose education and other qualifications are considered necessary in order to maintain the standard required of a commissioned officer in the Corps, and the procurement of enlisted reservists, presented a more difficult problem.

When we consider what inducements the Corps has to offer a man (engaged in the struggle of earning his own living in civil life, and in supporting his family), to join the Reserve, we find that there are but two: one, to offer a means of preparing him for an eventuality, which may never become a reality, that is, for defense of his country, and the other, which, after all is but a minor one, to be assured, if war does come, and the draft effective, that he is in a service of his own choice. In the final analysis, our only real appeal is to a man's patriotism, to his belief in National Preparedness, and to his desire to be associated with an arm of the service possessing the record of the Marine Corps.

It has been the experience of the officers of the regular service on duty in the Western Area, that the type of man we desire for a commission in the Reserve, is best procured by the reservists themselves and by personal individual contact with applicants or prospects by the regular officers on duty with the Reserve. A small amount of newspaper publicity is beneficial, but mass contact (*i.e.*, through the medium of addresses and speeches) does not attract the type of man we desire. Those applicants, who have been interested in the Reserve through the efforts of the Reserve Officers, are naturally of the same calibre as the latter, and insofar as the above-mentioned area is concerned, are of the highest type of patriotic, efficient, successful American citizens.

The enlisted personnel, excluding the twenty-five dollar a year Class III men, is being built up comparatively slowly by the Recruiting service and also through the efforts of the commissioned and enlisted reservists. Here, again, the personal individual contact is securing the type of man we desire.

The procedure of Headquarters, Marine Corps, in requiring all applications for commissions in the Reserve, to be forwarded to Headquarters for final action by the Reserve Board, and the issuance of commissions by Headquarters, is of great assistance to those of us "in the field," as is the policy of not originally commissioning in any grade higher than Captain, and in that grade only where prior service justifies such rank. In the first case, the applicant very properly feels that the question of personal influence to secure a commission has been eliminated and he is to be judged on his own merits; in the second case, especially to men of prior service, they feel that they are entering a service which has a real standard of proficiency required before making appointments to its various ranks.

It may be interesting to know, that men of the type we want, are not seekers after rank—if of prior service, they expect and want the rank held by them in that service. If of no prior service, realizing from their civilian experience that in any new business a man usually has to start in at the bottom and work up, they are willing and glad to be appointed Second Lieutenants and then perfect themselves in their military education and training. Ninety-nine out of a hundred of the latter class are business executives, and accustomed to handling men and large affairs, so they feel that basically they are of officer material.

Of the two classes of reserves, Fleet and Volunteer, it is realized that

the Fleet Reserve (due to the fact that twenty-eight years is the maximum age allowed for original commissioning and that training each year is required) is the most difficult class for which to secure applicants. The average desirable (from our point of view) young man, in civil life under twenty-eight, is either just starting out in business or is just getting well settled in his civil pursuits and unless he is a man of some independent means, he is not inclined to commit himself to an agreement—requiring training each year—which might interfere with his business. He is, however, willing, as are all the reserve officers, to take the Marine Corps Schools Correspondence courses, to take training *when* his business will permit, and to interest himself in and further the Reserve and the Corps in every possible way.

The Volunteer Reserve, with no training required but authorized upon the individual's own request, appears to be the best opening to the man of under twenty-eight years of age, especially, when he realizes that upon establishing his fitness at some future date, his transfer to the Fleet Reserve can be effected. Practically all applicants of over twenty-eight or those with no prior service, desire upon their appointment, to take steps to qualify themselves for transfer to the Fleet Reserve, at sometime in the future.

Once a reservist has been commissioned, whether in the Fleet or Volunteer Reserve, the problems which confront us of the regular service are their training and the maintenance of their interest in the Reserve. The training of Fleet Reserve is effected by the correspondence courses with the Marine Corps Schools, fifteen days each year at a Marine Barracks, and by such other means as can be devised. It must be realized, however, that the correspondence courses, as at present prescribed, are limited and will have to be expanded in the future, due to the fact that if a Reserve Officer pursues a normal rate of progress and completes a course each year, in three years he will have completed the courses now prescribed for the duty for which he has expressed a preference, namely, infantry, artillery, engineers, etc. The extension of these courses it is believed should be of the nature of map problems, instructional pamphlets, etc.

In regard to the training of the Reserve, the writer believes that the first training should be given at the Marine Barracks nearest to the Reservist's residence, where he should be given, first, the rifle and pistol courses; the balance of the time he should be given supervised observation of life in the post, its administration, drills and in general, full instruction as to how a Marine Corps post functions. In other words, his first year's training is one of indoctrination. For the succeeding years, he should attend a camp of instruction at either Quantico or San Diego; these camps must be progressive in steps each year, in order to retain interest as well as to broaden the training, and should be conducted by the officers of the regular service on duty with the Reserve Areas, assisted when necessary, by officers at the post where trained. The handling of the reserve training camps by the officers indicated above is the method pursued by the Army, and the writer is informed by officers of that service, is decidedly beneficial in its results.

The maintenance of the Reservist's interest in the Reserve and in the

Corps in time of peace is of prime importance, and in an effort to accomplish this, the following steps have been taken in the Western Area. A monthly circular is sent to all officers attached to the Area, which while primarily a regimental publication initiated to build up regimental esprit and preserve organization contact, is of application to all officers in the Area. It contains information concerning Reserve Officers' Associations activities, appointments, promotions, changes, reserve growth, names of applicants for commission, and in general, all matters thought to be of interest to the Reservists. A monthly Instruction Circular is also sent to all officers, covering subjects not included in the correspondence courses and designed primarily for those reservists without prior Marine Corps service. The circulars cover such subjects as a brief history of the Corps; its organization and functions, mission, organization of and duties of a Marine Corps Infantry Regiment and its units, etc.

In addition to the above circulars, in the majority of the large cities, the reserve officers have organized local Reserve Officers' Associations—these associations have bi-monthly or monthly, lunches or dinners, which serve to maintain contact between the reservists and the regular Corps, through the medium of the local Marine Corps Recruiting Officer. These meetings have most excellent results, not only in procuring desirable applicants for commissions in the reserve, such applicants being brought to the meetings as guests of the reserve officers, but in fostering interest in the Corps, the Reserve and in National Preparedness.

Another method of interesting Reserve Officers in the service is by means of an invitation to them to visit any Marine Corps post in whose vicinity they may find themselves. They are requested to call on the Commanding Officer of such a post, who has been directed by Headquarters to afford them every possible opportunity to become acquainted with the functioning of the post and secure as much of an insight into Marine Corps garrison life as is possible.

Additional measures to further the training and to retain an active interest in the Corps by the reservists must be originated and carried out if we are to have a real reserve and any suggestions from brother officers will be greatly appreciated by those of us on duty with the reserve.

The most important factor in not only building up the reserve, but in continuing it, is the attitude to and treatment of the reservists by the personnel of the regular Corps. The underlying principle in these factors is for the regular officer to remember at all times that the reservist is primarily a civilian and secondarily a military man; governmental requirements and methods of doing business, of correspondence, and in general the military point of view, are entirely different from the procedure and from the point of view to which he is habituated in business and civilian life. The reservist's entry into the service is based solely on his voluntary desire to be of value to his country in time of war; it is due to a thoroughly unselfish motive, and it infrequently entails a sacrifice on his part, without any recompense.

Reserve officers are anxious to learn and perfect themselves in the duties



which they may be called upon to perform in time of a National Emergency; they are desirous of understanding the military point of view, customs and requirements. If the regular officer, in his contact and dealings with the reservist, pursues a sympathetic and tactful attitude, he will find the reservist will respond and coöperate to the fullest extent.

In matters affecting errors, omissions, etc., in the official correspondence between regulars and reservists, a friendly letter explaining what is desired and why, instead of a curt, brief official letter, will more than repay for the time and effort expended in writing such a letter.

In the Western Area we have found that in the building up of the reserve, the interest taken by the reservists in not only the reserve but in the Corps as well, directly reflects the attitude, personality and endeavor of the local recruiting officers, who are in reality our liaison officers between the reservists and the regular Corps.

Another matter of importance bearing on the future of the reserve is the matter of promotion for reserve officers which it is understood is now being considered by Headquarters. The writer believes that promotion should be predicated on three factors: First, on length of service in grade; on qualifications, based on actual training received and studies completed; and on desirability, based on interest displayed and on leadership and personal qualifications as indicated by fitness reports of training period commander and on reports by Area Commander, Inspector-Instructor and in certain cases, by recruiting officers.

While the building up of our reserve officers' complement is slow, due to the care taken to pick the highest type, nevertheless, it is believed that steps should be instituted to weed out any inefficient material that may develop; this can easily be effected by requiring those who fail to qualify within a reasonable time after they become eligible for promotion, to take an examination to determine the retention of their rank; upon failure to pass this examination, the reservist to be discharged or given an additional opportunity to qualify, according to the recommendations of the examining board.

The largest part of this article has been devoted to the problems affecting the officer personnel, for in the main, Headquarters' policy of building up of an efficient reserve, officer personnel is, in line with the Army and Navy policies, the prime objective to be reached. However, the building up of an efficiently trained enlisted personnel, with a view to their eventual utilization, especially as non-commissioned officers in time of national emergency, is of great importance, especially when we realize that at such a time our enlisted personnel will largely come as a result of the draft.

The non-commissioned officers of the Fleet Reserve will not only furnish us with additional temporary officer personnel, but with a nucleus of trained staff and higher non-commissioned officers. The privates of the Fleet Reserve will render available to the Corps, non-commissioned officers of the four lower grades, and a nucleus of trained privates about which to build our increased war strength.

The volunteer enlisted reserve will furnish the Corps with a selected

voluntarily enlisted force, which will require but a very brief course of training before being available for assignment to the expeditionary forces.

In the Western Area, we have endeavored to recruit the enlisted reserve, first from ex-service men, the most desirable class, as their former service largely makes up for the deficiencies in training available to these men; and second, from among foremen, expert mechanics, and other leading trained men, and specialized workers, as it is considered the positions they fill in civil life will render them easily assimilated in time of National Emergency.

Due to the fact that enlisted men in the Fleet Reserve Companies are the only enlisted reservists authorized to receive a systematic, continuing course of training throughout the year, the training of the Volunteer Reserves is a problem which will require solving when we have the Fleet Reserve built up and well started on its progress. The Volunteer Reserve, however, does form a reserve for the formation of Fleet Reserve companies and undoubtedly in the future it will be productive of many such companies.

The writer believes that in the future, providing sufficient appropriations can be secured to support Fleet Reserve Companies in sufficient numbers, that the present reserve regiments, now composed of Twenty-five Dollar a year and Volunteer Reservists, should be made up of Fleet Reserve units of about sixty men strength, plus Class III or Twenty-five Dollar a year reservists, attached to the units nearest their place of residence, plus a certain number of Volunteer Reserves. The last named will constitute a source of supply from which to fill vacancies in the Fleet Reserve complements and a place to which to assign those who for one reason or another cannot continue to take the training required, or who are unable to undergo training.

The conviction that in the Reserves the Marine Corps has a tremendous asset is shared by all of the regular officers who have come into contact with them in this Area; this is an asset not only for the time of a National Emergency, but for peace-time as well. The war-time value to the Corps of its reservists needs no comment, but their peace-time value is not fully realized by those of the regular service, until they do come into contact with them. It is really an inspiration to meet the ideal type of patriotic, American citizens, who are coming into the Reserve; men actuated by no motive other than their desire to serve their country when needed, men who are keenly interested in the Corps, its past and its future, and who, in joining the reserve, signify their willingness to sacrifice their time for both pleasure and business in order to prepare themselves for an eventuality which may never materialize and men who will assist the Corps in every possible way.

## ON TRADITIONS

BY CAPTAIN OLIVER P. SMITH, U.S.M.C.

**T**RADITIONS are not made, they develop. Early primitive man had very few traditions to guide him. He was encompassed by a world peopled with strange and fearful animals. He reacted to pain and pleasure. He knew when he was hungry. He found by experiment the means to satisfy this hunger. He learned to discriminate between the members of the animal kingdom: those to fear and those which feared him. It was a continual struggle for existence. Being, presumably, gifted with a mind superior to that of any of the members of the animal kingdom, he was able to survive by his wits, when his strength availed him nothing. This primitive man's offspring were equipped with the same mental and physical qualities as the father. But they did not begin at the bottom again. At first there being no language the offspring emulated the actions of their parents. Gradually a fund of human knowledge was built up, each generation and each age adding something to the sum total of what was known before. This imparted knowledge was tradition.

Man never has faced the present and future without first looking backward. The lawyer consults his precedents, the legislator weighs the effect of previous laws, the soldier studies the campaigns of his predecessors. Man can see the effect of what has gone before and can face the present and future with greater confidence. Some of the basic principles of tactics were traditions before they became axioms. Modern tacticians accept as axiomatic the proposition that the best defense is a strong offense, yet this fact must have been discovered by our prehistoric ancestors in their encounters with the carnivorous beasts of their time. Also, the effect of surprise they soon discovered. Many of the animals whose flesh and fur were essential to their existence were fleet of foot and could only be killed by stealth. Legend hands down to us the account of the fall of Troy, which was finally accomplished by stealth and surprise. However, by this time man, having added to his traditions, was able to employ a far superior degree of finesse. The Q boat and the submarine furnish modern examples of the development of this last tradition.

With all the tremendous advance in human knowledge, man still likes to look backward. He is not self-sufficient; traditions give him confidence. What his predecessors have done he can do. He looks back with pride on their accomplishments and emulates them. Thus he progresses. Some traditions provide a glamour and romance to his institutions. Traditions of valor and success have won battles. One of the successful football coaches in the Middle West has stated that given two football teams possessed of equally good material and coaching, the team representing the college having the best traditions will win.

The America of the Caucasian is a comparatively new country. The Puritans, the Dutch, the Swedes, the Cavaliers, the Spanish, and the French all brought with them their traditions, transplanted them and developed them. The Anglo-Saxon, being the dominant racial stock, has given us most of our traditions.

In the course of its 151 years of existence, the Marine Corps has developed many fine traditions. There are traditions relating to the employment of Marines, traditions of the uniform, and traditions exemplifying their physical, mental, and moral qualities. These traditions bring to light the out of the way places of the world. They account for our sword. They have glorified the "hard-boiled" sergeant. And they exemplify the best in human character.

Our emblem symbolizes our employment. The Marine Corps Hymn expresses it in words. From "dawn to setting sun" is not poetic license. A Marine first sergeant is training the Fita Fitas in Samoa on one side of the international date line and marines in Guam are guarding an advanced base on the other side. Our expeditionary forces in France contained officers and men fresh from ships, Santo Domingo, Haiti, Nicaragua, Guam, the Philippines, and China. As you read the history of the Marine Corps the appropriateness of its emblem is apparent. Marines raised the flag for the first time on the soil of the old world on the walls of Derne in Tripoli. They planted the flag on the ramparts of the Corean forts on the Salée River. They are guarding the flag to-day in Peking and Managua. This universality of employment is a tradition handed down to us by the sea soldiers of Britain. Pepys relates that Charles II having verified a tale of flying fish by questioning Sir William Killigren, colonel "of the newly raised maritime regiment on the foot," . . . "glanced narrowly at the colonel's frank, weather-beaten face. Then with a laugh he turned to the secretary and said: 'Mr. Pepys, from the very nature of their calling, no class of our subjects can have so wide a knowledge of seas and lands as the officers and men of our loyal maritime regiment. Henceforth, whenever we cast doubt upon a tale that lacketh likelihood we will tell it to the Marines—if they believe it, it is safe to say it is true.'"

Because of their mobility and availability Marines have been universally employed. "From the very nature of their calling" they are either on the spot where the trouble occurs, or are ready to embark for the centre of the disturbance by the time the transport can get to the port of embarkation. Whether first to land to stop a fight or "First to Fight," they must uphold their traditions for availability and mobility.

These traditions find expression in the familiar "Tell it to the Marines," "From the Halls of Montezuma," "First to Fight," "Join the Marines and See the World," and "The Marines Have Landed . . ."

The appellation "leatherneck" relates to the uniform. Why a "leatherneck?" The use of the term with reference to the Marines is universal, but how many people associate it with the uniform? The fact that early Marines wore a black leather stock gave rise to a name which has been current for



several generations. Yet the first sailor who called a Marine a "leather-neck" was unaware of the fact that thereby he started a tradition.

When First Lieutenant Presley N. O'Bannon returned from Tripoli bringing with him a sword with a Mameluke hilt presented to him by a former Bashaw of Tripoli, he did not realize that this sword would be the symbol of authority of Marine officers a hundred years later, nor that a ship of the Navy would be named in his honor. The regulation can prescribe the weight, material, lines, and proportions of the sword, but they do not convey the significance of the sword nor paint the picture of the exploits of O'Bannon. Were it not for tradition the modern sword could be dispensed with. Its predecessor was a weapon, while the sword of to-day is a symbol.

Some years ago a board of officers met to devise an appropriate insignia for the Marine Corps. They fixed upon the familiar globe and anchor surmounted by a spread eagle. This insignia embodies the tradition of the universal employment of Marines, their sea traditions, and the symbol of the nation itself.

Secretary of War James McHenry on August 24, 1797, prescribed the uniform of Marines to be recruited for the new ships *Delaware*, *United States*, *Constellation*, and *Constitution*. Blue and red and gold was the color scheme then. The guard which paraded on the quarterdeck of the *Constitution* presented a more brilliant appearance, but the same blue, red, and gold lines up on the quarterdeck of the latest battleship at the call of "Full Guard and Band."

We can convince ourselves that it would be more economical in money and space to have only a summer and winter uniform, but why do we retain the undress blue? Why do we retain a uniform unfitted for field service? The explanation must be that we follow tradition.

Marines are "hard-boiled." The papers tell us so and the motion-picture capitalizes this quality. Yet a distinguished educator in commenting on the employment of marines in a turbulent Central American Republic, stated: "The Marines haven't fired a shot, nor have they been fired upon. They have actually prevented by their peaceful presence a great deal of bloodshed, and they are the best body of men in the world to do the task assigned to them." The task assigned them is not a new one. For generations they have been performing the tasks where the instructions are not to fire unless fired upon. Their presence is peaceful in that their presence is respected, but the respect would not be there were there any indications of weakness on their part. From the *Bon Homme Richard* to *Belleau Wood* the annals of the Marine Corps are filled with the accounts of strong men. No weakling ever repelled a boarding party or captured a machine gun nest. Then the Marines are in fact "hard-boiled," but only when their mission requires it.

The tradition of hardihood finds its peace-time expression on the football field. The President's Cup, the Southeast Championship, the Pacific Coast Championship, the championship of the Fifth Naval District, and of the Fourth Naval District indicate that this tradition in conjunction with other fine traditions is bearing fruit.

To a Marine the repelling of boarding attacks or the necessity of making his peaceful presence felt in out of the way places where rain, mud, and filth are the rule, has not exempted him from being traditionally neat and smart in appearance. An observer on John Paul Jones' ship remarked on the distinctive uniforms of the Marines and the smart evolutions through which the non-commissioned officers put the guard. When a Marine battalion was employed in suppressing the labor riots in 1877 their duties required their presence in several cities of Maryland and Pennsylvania. They were quartered at different times in depots, sheds, and under canvas, yet they found time for inspections and evening parades. The Army Medical Director of the Division of the Atlantic, who inspected the Marines at Reading, reported, . . . "I do not recollect ever having seen a more soldierly set of men. . . . It is quite remarkable that men performing such service are able to keep themselves and their arms, etc., so very clean and neat." Visit the Marine compartment of a battleship and you will find the Marine with his button board, his blanco, and his pressing table. Or go to the legation guard at Peking, surrounded by the rumblings of an awakening and perhaps defiant China, and you will find him brushing shoulders with the representatives of many nations and upholding his traditions.

The best blue uniform in the storeroom will not make a recruit look like a Marine, but as he develops, gains assurance, and imbibes some of the traditions of neatness and smartness, he begins to fit his uniform. He perhaps is not conscious of the fact that he is obeying tradition, but he wants to be a Marine; he wears his uniform like the "top sergeant," who learned his "stuff" from some earlier "top sergeant" and so on right back to the Marine who paraded on the quarterdeck in readiness to repel boarders.

Precision is the accompaniment of neatness and smartness. Not only precision in the matter of dress and evolutions, but in marksmanship. The mission of the Marine Corps has always demanded good shooting. There are many testimonials of the effectiveness of their fire against the enemy in the days of wooden ships. With the lengthening of the range of Naval Ordnance the necessity for rifle fire against the enemy vessel has disappeared, but the necessity therefor on shore is still with us. In recent years this tradition has been built up until the Commandant's Office is filled with trophies won in rifle and pistol competitions.

Tradition has set a high physical standard for Marines. They must demonstrate the quality of physical endurance on the football field as well as in action. They must exemplify neatness, smartness, precision, and soldierly bearing on the parade ground and the quarterdeck as well as cleanliness in camp and, in an emergency, the ability to demand respect by their presence or shoot straight if the occasion requires it.

The mental and moral qualities of the American Marine have been tested since the birth of the nation. All through the history of the Marine Corps there are examples of his versatility, trustworthiness, singleness and tenacity of purpose, pride, discipline, courage, faithfulness, and self-sacrifice.

"Necessity is the mother of invention." The nature of the duties per-

formed by Marines and their limited numbers have made versatility a necessary quality. There is not much room for overhead and specialization. In 1836, when Colonel Henderson was Commandant, he volunteered his services and those of the Corps to assist the Army in putting down the Indian uprisings in Florida. His offer was accepted and for a time the safeguarding of the navy yards was entrusted to civilian watchmen. Earlier Marines had fought pirates in the Barbary States, the West Indies and Quallah Battoo, and had brought the savages in Nooaheevah to terms. These Indian-fighting Marines acquitted themselves according to tradition and then went back to the navy yards.

The modern Marine does not concede anything in versatility to his predecessor. He is guarding the mails, serving in barracks and aboard ship, policing neutral zones in Nicaragua, running the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, and protecting American lives in China. Versatility is a tradition with him.

With a reputation for versatility he can be relied upon in an emergency. He has proven himself trustworthy. The Mexican War furnishes two fine examples of the reliance of a commander on the tried qualities of Marines. In his march from Vera Cruz to Mexico City, General Scott established an important supply depot at San Augustine, to guard which he assigned part of General Quitman's division, which included a battalion of Marines. General Scott said of this assignment: "I regret having been obliged, on the 20th, to leave Major-General Quitman, an able commander, with a part of his division—the fine Second Pennsylvania Volunteers, and the veteran detachment of United States Marines—at our important depot, San Augustine. It was there that I had placed our sick and wounded, the siege-, supply-, and baggage-trains. If these had been lost, the Army would have been driven almost to despair; and, considering the enemy's very great excess of numbers, and the many approaches to the depot, it might well have become, emphatically, *the post of honor*."

Later, Major Levi Twiggs, of the Marines, commanded the Volunteer Division assigned to the assault of Chapultepec. With Major Twiggs were seventy Marines acting as pioneers and in his support was Lieutenant-Colonel Watson with the remainder of the Marines. Major Twiggs was killed in the assault, but his sacrifice was not in vain. It is said that after the war General Scott made the statement that he had placed the Marines where the hardest work was to be accomplished and had never found his confidence misplaced.

Twice in recent years the guarding of the United States mails has been entrusted to Marines. For a quarter of a century Marines have been relied upon to protect the legation and American citizens resident in Peking. They were given these jobs because they were traditionally trustworthy.

One cannot help but be impressed with the singleness of purpose with which Marines have performed the tasks assigned them. The Corps throughout its history has been small and its personnel scattered. Large commands have been rare. They have been called upon to perform arduous and thankless duties in every part of the world. Ninety per cent. of their tasks are performed in times of peace. There is none of the pomp and circumstance

of war surrounding their departure and return. Many times their employment has been freely criticized. Contrast their going and coming with the wartime hysteria which accompanies a national emergency, when the uniform becomes a symbol of patriotism and the soldier a hero. Yet, whether the Marine was suppressing pirates, protecting a banana plantation, safeguarding American lives in a foreign port, or fighting in a real war, he has always given his best. He has learned the true meaning of service and has performed it with a singleness and sincerity of purpose whose reward is a task well done. And we have one more tradition to uphold.

Singleness of purpose without tenacity would be of little military value. Almost a century ago when war with Mexico was eminent and the acquisition of California by Great Britain was a possibility, President Polk felt it imperative to send instructions without delay to the American consul at Monterey, the senior naval officer afloat in Californian waters, and to Captain Frémont, who was on an exploring mission in California. He selected Lieutenant Gillespie of the Marines as his confidential agent. Gillespie made his way to the east coast of Mexico, crossed Mexico, disguised as a merchant, during the turmoil preceding the war, reported to Commodore Sloat on the *Cyane* at Mazatlan and proceeded thence to Monterey, where he communicated his instructions to Mr. Larkin, the consul. He found that Captain Frémont was somewhere in northern California and set out to find him. After a trek of six hundred miles through a strange country inhabited by unfriendly Indians, he located Frémont near the Oregon boundary and delivered his message. As far as can be gleaned from contemporaneous accounts, the instructions from President Polk were to resist any attempt at foreign acquisition of California and to encourage its annexation. It is history now that our western boundary was extended to the waters of the Pacific shortly thereafter, and Gillespie, by his courage and tenacity of purpose was largely instrumental in setting at work the agencies which saved California to the Union. Modern methods of communication would remove the necessity for Gillespie's perilous trip, but he has handed down to us a tradition for tenacity of purpose which science and invention cannot improve upon.

Gillespie possessed individual tenacity of purpose. The Marine division on the *Cumberland* which stuck to their guns in the action with the *Merrimac* and fired the last shot from their sinking ship, despite the fact that the first shot from the *Merrimac* had killed nine of their number, illustrated a collective tenacity of purpose whose foundation was discipline. War by its frightfulness cannot help but disorganize our mental and physical processes. Because of this disorganization the average man must be taught to instinctively obey. The leader is the officer or man whom other men will instinctively follow. In time of peace we call an organization disciplined when it presents a neat and smart appearance on the parade ground, when the men are willing and their conduct record is good. These qualities indicate the recognition of authority, an essential of discipline in action. The Marine division on the *Cumberland* must have had this essential quality.



Much bloodshed has been saved by discipline. None but a disciplined organization would preserve its equilibrium in the face of the threats, curses, stones and occasional shots from an angry mob and yet disperse the mob without bloodshed. Man is not prone to "turn the other cheek," and it requires the strictest kind of discipline to keep him from striking back. Discipline is firmly fixed as a tradition of the Corps; the consideration of the present-day Marine is to live up to that tradition.

Sometimes it takes courage to make a decision, but more often it is the carrying out of the decision which demands the utmost in courage and devotion to duty. At Chapultepec, General Scott made the decision to carry the castle by assault; Major Levi Twiggs, of the Marines, led the assault at the cost of his own life. He, no doubt, considered the head of the assaulting column a post of honor, as his predecessors did, and as tradition bids us do.

The words of Commodore Shubrick, "The Marines have behaved with the fidelity and constancy which characterizes that valuable Corps, . . ." have a familiar ring. They referred to the conduct of Marines in the Pacific Squadron in the Mexican War, but the same sentiments had been expressed before and have since been embodied in our motto, "Semper Fidelis." General Eaton informed Aaron Burr that "the Marine Corps stand as they should stand." Burr soon found where they stood, for they were sent to the centre of the conspiracy and to them was entrusted the guarding of the imprisoned conspirators. In the greatest of all wars the Marines stood as they should stand, ever faithful. "Semper Fidelis" embodies a tradition which will last.

The Marine who interposed his arm to ward off the sword thrust aimed at the head of Decatur practiced fidelity to the point of self-sacrifice. He lost his arm but added lustre to the traditions of the Marine Corps.

Can we help but "glory in the title of United States Marines" when we cast our glance backward? Pride of person and pride of accomplishment are qualities which we strive to instil in every Marine, and what better way can we accomplish this than by arousing in him the desire to emulate these qualities in his predecessors. Pride is a heritage of Marines.

Every tradition we have is a tradition of the Marine Corps. Companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades have distinguished themselves, but their accomplishments have become traditions of the Corps as a whole. We have an "esprit de corps," which implies "sympathy, enthusiasm, devotion, and jealous regard for the honor of the body as a whole." And this spirit of oneness exists despite the fact that Marines are scattered in small detachments over half the face of the globe. In the Army the Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Engineers have their traditions. The divisions and regiments have theirs. It is the Infantry team which played the Marines for the President's Cup. The runner-up to the Marines in the National Matches may be the Cavalry or the Engineers. Never the Army. This branch, division, or regimental spirit in the Army is inevitable because of its organization. We are fortunate in that our traditions have given us an esprit de corps, a spirit of the whole.

In this respect the Navy resembles the Marine Corps. Our traditions are bound up with those of the Navy. We differ in our adaptability. There is something incongruous in the consideration of a bluejacket in the trenches, although the Naval medical personnel were there. Yet the Marines adapted themselves to the trenches as well as they ever did to the quarterdeck and the gun deck. The traditions of the Navy are mainly sea traditions; ours spring from accomplishments ashore as well as afloat. We also differ in our conception of discipline as handed down to us by tradition. The Marine has always been the watch-dog of the ship, the backbone of the military organization, and to him has been entrusted the ceremonial details. This employment has left its imprint. The Marine knows he is a better soldier than the bluejacket, that he can handle himself better in the field and that he is given positions of trust over his shipmates. He is apt to laugh at the bluejacket under arms and at drill, but he will gladly lend a hand in the fireroom on a full-power run or go in the handling room to assist a turret crew in target practice, because he cannot help but admire the spirit with which a bluejacket does a bluejacket's work. There is something inspiring in the clockwork precision of a turret crew in action; there is much to be admired in the "black gang" who give their best to keep the engineering record clear. A Marine finds that a bluejacket, too, knows discipline.

The wardroom is a clearing house for traditions, both good and bad. Sometimes one is inclined to believe that Shakespeare was right when he had Mark Anthony declaim: "The evil that men do lives after them, the good is oft interred with their bones." At any rate the supposed partiality of our predecessors for their "bunks," their competition with the chaplain for a sinecure, and their addiction to the bottle has lived after them. These traditions remain the property of the wardroom. But it was not such traditions which prompted the foremost naval commanders of their time to overwhelm Congress with protests against the proposition in 1866 to transfer the Corps to the Army, nor would they prompt the Admiral of the Navy to state as he did in 1874, "From time immemorial the Corps has held a high position in the estimation of the most experienced officers of the Navy, and whenever an effort to reduce it has been made and the matter has been carefully examined into by Congress, such attempt has uniformly failed." These expressions of confidence were not political; they came from the heart and were induced by an appreciation of our best traditions.

Our mission demands harmonious coöperation with the Navy. Understanding is necessary before coöperation is possible. The Marine aboard ship must be more than a policeman, a gunner or an ornament to the quarterdeck; he is there to learn to know the Navy, to imbibe its traditions, and inversely to induce a proper understanding of the mission of the Marine Corps and an appreciation of our traditions. It is too late to do this after the emergency arises. One may justly feel that the outcome of the Gallipoli Expedition would have been far different had there been a proper understanding between the land and naval forces.

Our employment with the Navy has left its impress on our traditions,

which is true to a lesser extent as a result of our employment with the Army. Other agencies also affect them. The press keeps them fresh in our memory and allows no lapse from the high standard set by them. The policy of the government itself has given us our universal employment. Without the modern interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and the avowed intention of the government to protect its nationals, the Marine Corps might not have been able to build up such fine traditions for availability and mobility, nor would they have had the ever-recurring opportunities to prove their moral fibre. The press and the policy of the government do not adversely affect our traditions. What of modern progress, speed, and invention? Tradition implies something of slow growth and development. The answer is that methods and equipment may change radically and rapidly, but the fundamental moral qualities are unchangeable. The traditional uniform may slide into oblivion; faithfulness to-day is just as much a virtue as it was a thousand years ago or will be a thousand years hence.

Only when we emulate our traditions do they enrich us and enhance our value. In the language of the military, we must consolidate our position and advance. We cannot long shine in reflected glory. The barbarian no longer feared the legions of decadent Rome, because these legions had ceased to emulate the qualities of Cæsar's legions, which had brought so much glory to the Empire. There is much harking back to the good old days of "wooden ships and iron men," and some scoffing at the emphasis now placed on military education. Emulation of the hardihood, courage, faithfulness, and self-sacrifice of these "iron men" is commendable, but we must stop there. In an area of speed, progress, and invention, the modern Marine has come to appreciate the fact that "knowledge is power," and without it he could not uphold his traditions for availability, mobility, versatility, and efficiency. Our traditions demand that our methods keep step with progress. Without progress we could not remain faithful to our mission. Without a faithful fulfilment of our mission the Marine Corps would cease to exist.

## PROPOSED PERSONNEL LEGISLATION

**F**OR several months a Board appointed by the Major General Commandant to consider the question of the distribution and promotion of the commissioned personnel of the Marine Corps has been in session at the Headquarters of the Corps in Washington.

The Board is constituted as follows:

Brigadier General B. H. Fuller, President,  
Colonel Harold C. Reisinger,  
Colonel Douglas McDougal,  
Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Creecy,  
Major Ralph S. Keyser,  
Major Edwin H. Brainard, and  
Captain Charles Ubel, Members, and  
Captain Eugene F. C. Collier, Recorder.

The Board has submitted its report to the Major General Commandant, together with a proposed draft of a Bill to be presented in Congress, and we publish herewith this draft of the proposed Bill.

The Major General Commandant has decided to take no steps toward having the Bill presented during the present session of Congress, but a copy of the report of the Board and the proposed Bill will be mailed to each commissioned officer of the Marine Corps and they will be given an opportunity to submit such remarks therein as they may desire.

After the receipt of such remarks and opinions from the officers of the Corps a Bill will be presented to Congress, the exact form thereof depending upon the final decision of the Secretary of the Navy.

### A BILL TO REGULATE THE DISTRIBUTION AND PROMOTION OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE MARINE CORPS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SEC. I. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That existing law providing for the distribution of commissioned officers on the active list in the various grades of the Marine Corps is hereby amended so that hereafter such distribution shall be in the proportion of one-half of one per centum in the grade of major general of the line, including the Major General Commandant, one-half of one per centum in the grade of brigadier general of the line, three and one-half per centum in the grade of colonel of the line, six and one-half per centum in the grade of lieutenant colonel, twelve per centum in the grade of major, twenty-seven per centum in the grade of captain, and fifty per centum in the grades of first lieutenant and second lieutenant combined: *Provided*, That no officer shall be reduced in rank or pay, or separated from the active list of the Marine Corps, as a result of any computation made to determine the authorized number of officers in the various grades of such



Corps, except as hereinafter provided: *Provided further*, That officers in the grade of second lieutenant, upon the completion of three years' service in that grade, including probationary service, shall be promoted to the grade of first lieutenant subject to examination prescribed by law: *Provided further*, That the Major General Commandant shall be ex-officio the ranking officer of the Marine Corps: *Provided further*, That promotions of brigadier generals of the line to the grade of major general shall be made according to seniority: *Provided further*, That promotions to the grade of brigadier general of the line shall be made only from colonels of the line: *Provided further*, That hereafter any officer while serving as head of a staff department, any officer of the rank of brigadier general or colonel who holds a permanent appointment in a staff department, and any officer holding such appointment upon promotion to the grade of colonel, shall be borne as an additional number on the Navy list: *Provided further*, That any line officer now borne as an additional number on the Navy list in the grade of colonel shall, upon the passage of this Act, cease to be so borne and shall be included in the total number of colonels, as authorized by this Act, in his present position on the lineal list with respect to other officers in the same grade: *Provided further*, That when, in any fiscal year, no vacancies occur in the grades of general officers of the line of the Marine Corps from other causes the President shall select for retirement one officer from among the general officers of the line of the Marine Corps, who, on June 30th, will have completed three or more years' service under a permanent appointment in either or both of those grades, and the officer so selected shall be transferred to the retired list as of June 30th as hereinafter provided for other officers.

SEC. 2. That hereafter promotions to fill vacancies on the active list in the grades of brigadier general of the line, colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, and captain in the Marine Corps, shall be made from promotion lists, and transfers to the retired list or to the Marine Corps Reserve, under the provisions of Section 4 of this Act, of officers in the grades of colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, captain, first lieutenant and second lieutenant shall be made from transfer lists, such promotion lists and transfer lists to be prepared by boards of officers, and to become effective when approved by the President as hereinafter provided for: *Provided*, That except as otherwise provided in Section 1 of this Act, promotions to fill vacancies in any of the above-mentioned grades shall be made by seniority from officers in the next lower grade, whether in the line or holding permanent appointment in a staff department, whose names appear on said promotion lists, subject to examination prescribed by law. Officers so promoted shall take rank with one another in accordance with their seniority in the grade from which promoted.

SEC. 3. That a senior board for the preparation of the promotion lists of officers for promotion to the grades of brigadier general, colonel, and lieutenant colonel, and of the transfer lists of officers in the grades of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, and of the eligible lists for the heads of the staff departments as provided for in Section 7 of the Act, entitled "An Act Providing for sundry matters affecting the naval service, and for other

purposes," approved March 4, 1925, consisting if possible of seven, but of not less than five general officers of the line on the active list, and a junior board for the preparation of the promotion lists of officers for promotion to the grades of major and captain and of the transfer lists of officers in the grades of captain, first lieutenant and second lieutenant consisting of at least nine officers on the active list of the rank of lieutenant colonel and above, shall be appointed by the Secretary of the Navy and convened during the month of June of each year and as soon after the first day of the month as practicable: *Provided*, That when the senior board is considering any officer who holds a permanent appointment in a staff department, there shall be added to its membership, if possible, the heads of the staff departments.

Each member of said boards shall swear, or affirm, that he will, without prejudice or partiality, and having in view the special fitness of officers for promotion and the efficiency of the Marine Corps, perform the duties imposed upon him as herein provided.

The Secretary of the Navy shall furnish to each board for its consideration in the preparation of promotion lists and transfer lists the names and records of all officers, exclusive of those already borne on such lists, who are included in the first four-sevenths of the authorized number of officers in each grade under consideration by said board irrespective of their length of service in the grade, and, in addition, the names and records of all other officers in such grades not included in the first four-sevenths thereof who shall have completed three or more years of service in their grade on the 30th of June next following the meeting of the board; the grades of first lieutenant and second lieutenant being combined as one grade for the purpose of this paragraph. He shall at the same time prescribe to each board the number of officers in each grade to be placed on the promotion lists and the minimum number of officers to be placed on the transfer lists as required by this Act.

The number of officers in each grade whose names shall be borne on the promotion list in any year, including any officers in the grade remaining on such list, shall be one-seventh of the authorized number of officers in the next higher grade plus the number of vacancies then existing and which will occur in such higher grades on or before June 30th: *Provided*, That in the case of the promotion list for promotion to brigadier general of the line there shall be added to the result of the computations herein prescribed the number of such additional vacancies in that grade as may be expected during the ensuing fiscal year.

The minimum number of officers in each grade whose names shall be borne on the transfer list in any fiscal year, including any officers in the grade remaining on such list, shall be one-seventh of the authorized number of officers in such grade less the number of vacancies occurring in that grade during that fiscal year.

The board shall consider the special fitness for promotion of each officer subject to consideration until the number of officers prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy has been recommended for promotion and until not less than the number of officers so prescribed has been recommended for transfer:

*Provided*, That any officer who is not placed on the promotion list, and who is senior to the junior officer in his grade placed on such list, shall be placed on the transfer list.

Each board shall include in its report to the Secretary of the Navy lists of the names of all officers in each grade who have been considered by it, designating thereon the officers recommended by it for promotion and the officers recommended by it for transfer. When the report of the board has been approved by the President the lists of those officers recommended by the board for promotion shall constitute the promotion lists referred to in Section 2 of this Act, and the lists of those officers recommended by it for transfer shall constitute the transfer lists referred to in the same section. The senior board shall further report the lists of those officers who have been found eligible for appointment as head of a staff department, and these lists, when approved by the President, shall become the eligible lists for appointment of heads of staff departments referred to in Section 7 of the Act, entitled "An Act Providing for sundry matters affecting the naval service, and for other purposes," approved March 4, 1925: *Provided*, That all officers who have once been placed on a promotion list shall remain thereon until promoted, except as otherwise provided in this section; and that all officers who have once been placed on a transfer list shall remain thereon until transferred to the retired list or to the Marine Corps Reserve: *Provided further*, That if, as a result of the sentence of a court-martial, any officer whose name is borne on a promotion list loses sufficient numbers on the lineal list to make him junior to the senior officer in the same grade who is neither on a promotion list nor on a transfer list, his name shall be removed from the promotion list and he shall again become subject to consideration in his turn by seniority according to his new position on the lineal list: *Provided further*, That any officer considered by a board in any year and not placed either on a promotion list or on a transfer list under the provisions of this Act shall be subject to consideration for promotion or transfer by succeeding boards: *Provided further*, That if any officer on a promotion list fails to pass a satisfactory professional examination as required by law his name shall be removed from the promotion list and he shall be subject to consideration for promotion or transfer by the next succeeding board: *Provided further*, That if any officer on a promotion list fails to pass a satisfactory examination morally and is reported unfit for promotion as a result of such examination, he shall be discharged with one year's pay: *Provided further*, That if in any year the number of officers on any promotion list is insufficient to fill vacancies, the Secretary of the Navy is authorized, in his discretion, to convene an additional board or boards, constituted as herein provided, to prepare additional promotions lists and transfer lists, which lists shall be effective from the date of approval of the report of any such board by the President.

SEC. 4. That, on June 30th of each year, officers in the grades of colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, and captain, and first lieutenant and second lieutenant combined for the purposes of this Section, whose names are on an

approved transfer list, shall, in the order of their seniority in their respective grades, be transferred to the retired list or to the Marine Corps Reserve to the number of one-seventh of the authorized number of officers in their respective grades, less the number of vacancies occurring in their respective grades during the fiscal year ending on that date: *Provided*, That, on June 30th of each year, any officer borne as an additional number on the Navy list, other than the heads of the staff departments, whose name is not on an approved promotion list, or on an approved eligible list of officers for appointment as head of a staff department, and who is senior to the junior officer in the same grade not borne as an additional number on the Navy list who is transferred to the retired list or to the Marine Corps Reserve during that fiscal year under the provisions of this section, shall, in addition to the number provided above, be retired or transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve as provided in this section for other officers.

SEC. 5. That all officers with over thirty years total service, counting all service for which they would be entitled to credit for voluntary retirement under the law, transferred in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of this Act, shall be transferred to the retired list.

SEC. 6. That all officers transferred to the retired list pursuant to any section of this Act shall receive pay at the rate of two and one-half per centum of their active duty pay, multiplied by the number of years of service which they were entitled to count toward the computation of their longevity pay on the active list, as defined in the eleventh paragraph of Section 1 of "An Act to readjust the pay and allowances of the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service," approved June 10, 1922, not to exceed a total of seventy-five per centum of such active duty pay.

SEC. 7. That all officers with less than thirty years' total service, transferred in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of this Act, shall be transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve: *Provided*, That any such officers commissioned as second lieutenant or above in the Marine Corps while holding permanent warrant or permanent commissioned warrant rank in the Marine Corps or permanent appointment as pay clerk in the Marine Corps, shall have the option of reverting to such permanent warrant or permanent commissioned warrant status in the lineal position on the active list to which their seniority would have entitled them had their service subsequent to such commission been rendered in the status to which they revert: *Provided further*, That officers reverting to a permanent warrant or a permanent commissioned warrant status, as provided in this section, shall be borne temporarily as additional numbers in the grades to which they revert: *Provided further*, That no vacancies occurring in the grades of marine gunner, quartermaster clerk, or pay clerk shall be filled so long as by reason of the operation of this section the total number of officers in the grade in which the vacancy occurs exceeds that authorized by law.

SEC. 8. That all officers transferred in accordance with Section 1 or Section 4 of this Act shall receive, for such period of time after the date



of such transfer as may be necessary to reach their homes from their last permanent stations of duty when travelling by the shortest usually travelled route, including unavoidable delays in transportation, the pay, allowances and other benefits, including transportation for their dependents and effects, that they would have received upon permanent change of station between the same two points if they had remained on the active list.

SEC. 9. That officers in all grades above that of second lieutenant who, by June 30th of any year, will have ten or more years' service as computed for purposes of pay, may, by official application to the Secretary of the Navy prior to May 1st in such year, have their names placed on a list which shall be known as the list of "Applicants for voluntary transfer to the retired list or to the Marine Corps Reserve." The President may, in his discretion, in the order of seniority of the applicants in each grade, place on the retired list, or transfer to the Marine Corps Reserve, a number of said applicants not to exceed in any fiscal year one general officer and three per centum of the authorized number of other officers in their respective grades, on the same terms as officers of said grades who are transferred pursuant to Section 1 or Section 4 of this Act.

SEC. 10. (a) That the Marine Corps Reserve, as created by the Act of February 28, 1925, shall hereafter include an additional class, namely, the Transferred Officers' Reserve; which shall be composed of commissioned officers transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve from the regular Marine Corps as provided by this Act.

(b) That members of the Transferred Officers' Reserve shall at all times be subject to the laws and regulations for the government of the regular Marine Corps, and shall not be discharged from the Marine Corps Reserve except at their own request, or upon completion of their prescribed terms of service therein, or by sentence of a court-martial, or by order of the President upon conviction by a civil court for an offense involving a felony, or when transferred to the retired list of the Marine Corps as prescribed in this Act.

(c) That all officers of the Transferred Officers' Reserve in the grade of major or above, and captains and lieutenants of such Reserve who have completed twenty or more years of service prior to transfer to such Reserve, counting all service as provided in Section 5 of this Act, shall be transferred to the retired list of the Marine Corps without change in their rate of pay upon completing thirty years' service, counting all service as provided in Section 5 of this Act, and all time in the Transferred Officers' Reserve.

(d) That captains and lieutenants of the Transferred Officers' Reserve who have completed less than twenty years of service upon transfer to such Reserve, counting all service as provided in Section 5 of this Act, shall be honorably discharged from the Marine Corps Reserve at the expiration of seven years from the date of their transfer thereto, unless upon their own request they shall be transferred to other classes of the Marine Corps Reserve under such regulations as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe.

(e) That members of the Transferred Officers' Reserve shall not, in time

of peace, be ordered to active duty except with their own consent and shall be under no obligation to perform training duty or drill.

(f) That, when not on active duty, officers of the Transferred Officers' Reserve coming under the provisions of paragraph (c) of this section shall be entitled to annual pay at the same rate as prescribed in this Act for officers transferred to the retired list of the Marine Corps computed as at time of transfer to the Transferred Officers' Reserve, and other officers of the Transferred Officers' Reserve shall be entitled to pay as follows: When transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve they shall be paid an amount equal to three years' pay for captains and two years' pay for lieutenants, at the rate they were receiving at the time of such transfer; thereafter they shall receive, when not on active duty, annual pay at the rate of one-third for captains and one-sixth for lieutenants of the annual pay they were receiving at the time of such transfer: *Provided*, That when employed on active duty, members of the Transferred Officers' Reserve shall receive the same pay, allowances, gratuities and other emoluments provided for officers of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve on active duty.

(g) That the Secretary of the Navy shall make all necessary regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, for the administration of the Transferred Officers' Reserve and for adopting thereto the provisions of the Naval Reserve Act approved February 28, 1925, in so far as the same may be applied: *Provided*, That officers of the regular Marine Corps transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve and officers of the Marine Corps Reserve transferred to the retired list of the Marine Corps as authorized by this Act shall be appointed by the President in the grades of the Service to which transferred corresponding to the grades from which transferred and with the same precedence that they had when on the active list; and said new appointments shall terminate their appointments in the service from which transferred: *Provided further*, That officers of the regular Marine Corps shall, when transferred to the retired list, have the same precedence on that list that they had when on the active list.

SEC. 11. That in making any computation required or authorized by, or pursuant to, this Act, whenever a final fraction of one-half or more occurs, the whole number next above shall be regarded as the authorized number except in computations involving the number of years' service for pay purposes: *Provided*, That in computations involving the number of officers there shall be excluded from consideration those officers carried by law as additional numbers on the Navy list.

SEC. 12. That that part of Section 7 of an Act entitled "An Act providing for sundry matters affecting the naval service, and for other purposes," approved March 4, 1925, providing that any officer of the grade of colonel whose name is not borne on one of the current eligible lists for appointment as brigadier general or head of a staff department shall, if more than fifty-six years of age, be retired, is hereby repealed: *Provided*, That no provisions of this Act, other than those contained in Section 3 thereof, shall operate to change the manner of filling any vacancy that may occur as head of a staff

department as provided by Section 7 of the aforesaid Act approved March 4, 1925: *Provided further*, That in case there be no officer holding a permanent appointment in a staff department whose name is borne on the eligible list for appointment as head of that department, the appointment as head of such department shall be made from officers holding the rank of colonel in the Marine Corps, excepting those whose names are borne upon an approved transfer list: *Provided further*, That no line officer whose name is on an approved transfer list shall be placed upon the eligible list for head of any staff department: *Provided further*, That any line officer serving as head of a staff department shall, although carried as an additional number on the Navy list, retain his position on the lineal list with respect to other officers in the grade in which he holds a permanent commission, and shall be subject to consideration for permanent promotion under the same conditions as if he were not serving as head of a staff department; but the appointment of such officer as head of a staff department shall terminate upon the date of his acceptance of a permanent commission as brigadier general of the line: *Provided further*, That any line officer holding appointment as head of a staff department shall, upon the termination of such appointment, revert to the grade in which he holds a permanent commission, in his retained position on the lineal list; and if such grade is then already at authorized strength, he shall be carried temporarily as an additional number until a vacancy occurs therein.

SEC. 13. That all Acts and parts of Acts, in so far as they conflict with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed.

## PROFESSIONAL NOTES

PREPARED IN THE DIVISION OF OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, HEADQUARTERS,  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

### OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA

**D**UE to the spread of the revolution in Nicaragua it became necessary on January 4, 1927, to augment the forces at the disposal of the Commander, Special Service Squadron, by the Second Battalion, Fifth Regiment, stationed at Guantanamo Bay, and Lieutenant Colonel James J. Meade was ordered to report to the Commander, Special Service Squadron, as the Commanding Officer, Marine Force, Special Service Squadron.

The U. S. S. *Argonne* sailed from Guantanamo Bay with Colonel Meade and the Second Battalion, Fifth Regiment (less 43d Company), on board and arrived at Bluefields, January 10, 1927. Admiral Latimer immediately ordered this battalion to be transferred to barges and proceed up the Escondido River to Rama where fighting between the two factions was imminent, and a neutral zone was to be established. In spite of bad weather conditions this transfer of the force, the trip up the Escondido River to Rama and the disembarkation there was made without incident. Lieutenant Ralph C. Alburger, with one rifle squad and a machine gun, was assigned a launch and the duty of preceding the barges up the river and notifying all revolutionary posts that this move was being made and warning them that no fighting would be permitted within the neutral zone to be established at Rama. The revolutionists in this area were under the command of General Mena. Lieutenant Alburger visited five revolutionary outposts along the river and found the revolutionists occupying them with detachments varying in strength from 25 to 200 men. He received courteous treatment and nothing of unusual interest occurred.

Upon arrival at Rama the Marine forces found the place strongly occupied by the conservative army under General Arguella with a force of 1200 men in and around Rama, of whom at least 750 were well armed. This force had one 180-mm. French cannon, 7 Lewis guns and 500,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. In spite of this fact the revolutionists, with a much smaller force, held the river and had them cut off from communication with Bluefields. Although General Arguella protested our establishment of a neutral zone at Rama, he withdrew his force beyond the zone, taking them further up the river by means of a motor schooner and the motor boat towing dugout canoes. Nothing of an unusual nature occurred, and on January 18th this force, less the 51st Company, was withdrawn to Bluefields and embarked on board the U. S. S. *Argonne* for transfer through the Canal for duty on the Pacific side.

Because of the disturbed conditions in the western part of Nicaragua and the danger to the lives and property of Americans in that part of the country, the Commander, Special Service Squadron, proceeded to Corinto in his Flagship and ordered the U. S. S. *Galveston* to send its landing force to Managua



as a guard for our Legation. When the Marines on board the *Argonne* arrived at Corinto the Admiral ordered them to relieve the *Galveston's* landing force at Managua, and this was accomplished on January 31st.

Following the transfer of the Marine Battalion to Managua a serious revolutionary outbreak occurred at Chinandega on the railroad between Corinto and Managua, and fighting there continued for several days which interrupted railroad traffic at Corinto. The establishment of a number of neutral zones in the east, forced the revolutionists to extend their activities to the west, and this developed in recent fighting in the province of Matagalpa, which is the centre of large foreign coffee and mining interests.

Mr. Dennis, the Secretary of the Legation, who visited Matagalpa, was fired upon by the revolutionists, and although no one in his automobile was injured, a bullet entered the back of the car. This, with the cutting of the railroad to Corinto, produced a serious situation that has necessitated the dispatch to Nicaragua of additional Marines, and at this writing the Fifth Regiment, augmented by a rifle company and an Aviation Division of six D. H. airplanes, is under orders for expeditionary duty in Nicaragua.

#### OPERATIONS IN CHINA

Because of the grave situation brought about by the threat of the revolutionists in China to seize Shanghai, our Government decided on the request of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to place at his disposal additional Marine forces. To carry this out, a Provisional Battalion of three companies was made up at Guam under the command of Major Wilcox, and the Admiral ordered this force to proceed immediately to Shanghai where it is now serving.

The Fourth Regiment, under the command of Colonel Hill, sailed from San Diego on February 3, 1927, and is now en route across the Pacific to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

#### MAIL GUARD

Due to the disturbed conditions in Nicaragua and China and the liability for the Marine Corps to be called upon to furnish expeditionary forces for these countries, the Major General Commandant arranged for the gradual withdrawal of the Marines guarding the United States Mail. This withdrawal began on January 12, 1927, and the plan contemplated the gradual withdrawal, relieving the Marines from this duty beginning with men on duty at the least important places, and final withdrawal to be completed by July 1, 1927.

More recent developments necessitated a change in this plan to the extent of effecting the complete withdrawal immediately, and all of the Marines on Mail Guard duty were returned to their regular stations on February 19, 1927.

After the decision had been made to withdraw all of the Marines from Mail Guard duty the Postmaster General addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Navy expressing his appreciation of the manner in which the duty had been performed. The letter is as follows:

Post Office Department,  
United States of America.

OFFICE OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, WASHINGTON.

16 February, 1927.

HONORABLE CURTIS D. WILBUR,  
Secretary of the Navy,  
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

General Lejeune has informed me that the exigencies of the service require the withdrawal of the last of the contingent of United States Marines that have been detailed to service with the Post Office Department in the guarding of United States mails for the last four months.

This Department parts with them with regret. The service they have rendered has been of the highest order of excellence and the fact that during their presence on duty there has not been a single attempt by organized banditry at robbery of the mails is in itself convincing on that point.

On behalf of the Post Office Department, I wish to express to the Navy Department our appreciation of the help the Marines have rendered. Will you please convey this expression to General Lejeune and the officers and men of the Marine Corps?

With assurances of highest regard and esteem, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ HARRY S. NEW,

Postmaster General.

#### STRENGTH OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The strength of the Marine Corps Reserve, February 1, 1927, was as follows:

Class I. Officers, Fleet Reserve .....	191
Class V. Officers, Volunteer Reserve .....	153
Class II. 16-20 year men, Fleet Reserve .....	262
Class III. \$25 a year men, Fleet Reserve .....	2218
Class IV. Enlisted men, Fleet Reserve .....	590
Class VI. Enlisted men, Volunteer Reserve .....	952
Total: Officers .....	344
Enlisted men .....	4022

#### FLEET MARINE CORPS RESERVE COMPANIES ON DRILL PAY STATUS

Company	Location	Enlisted strength	Officer strength
301st	Boston	55	2
302nd	Rochester	43	1
303rd	New York	60	2
305th	Philadelphia	52	2
306th	Detroit	55	1
307th	Los Angeles	49	2
309th	Philadelphia	60	2

#### RANK OF RESERVE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS TRANSFERRED FROM FLEET RESERVE COMPANIES TO INACTIVE UNITS

It has been decided in the case of non-commissioned officers transferred from Fleet Reserve Companies to inactive units of the Reserve that the same procedure be followed as in the case in the regular service, and that when

such transfers are made to organizations that are in an inactive status these non-commissioned officers will be permitted to retain their warrants in the organization to which transferred.

#### CHANGE IN UNIFORM REGULATIONS

Uniform Regulations have been changed so that the wearing of the letter "R" on the uniform by Reserve officers is no longer required. This change in regulations makes the uniform for both the Regular and Reserve the same, and is in line with bringing the Reserve in closer relationship with the regular service and making it a component part of the Marine Corps.

#### CHANGES IN ARTICLE THIRTEEN, MARINE CORPS MANUAL

The following change has been made in Article 13, Marine Corps Manual:

13-6 (6) *Fleet Reserve Company*: This term refers to a company organized under authority of the Major General Commandant with a specific strength and composition. It is uniformed and equipped, performs drills for which pay is allowed and attends training camps as a unit. Its officers are assigned by the Major General Commandant and its title is a numerical designation greater than 300.

13-6 (7) *Volunteer Reserve Company*: This term refers to a company whose organization is similar to a Fleet Reserve Company but for which no drill pay is allowed, and its title is a numerical designation greater than 400.

#### RESERVE OFFICERS AS RECRUITING OFFICERS

Reserve Area Commanders have been authorized to designate the Commanding Officers of the 301st to 310th Companies as recruiting officers for the Marine Corps Reserve. They are also authorized to designate such other Reserve Officers who will serve without pay, so that all sections of their area will be covered by an appropriate number of recruiting officers. These officers must signify their willingness to serve on this duty without pay, and this information will be incorporated in their orders. Reserve officers designated as recruiting officers are authorized to administer oaths in connection with the appointment of officers and enlistment of men in the Marine Corps Reserve.

#### OVERCOATS FOR FLEET RESERVE COMPANIES

The issue of overcoats to members of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve Companies has been authorized. This change will give the members of these companies the following clothing issue:

##### *For Drills and Training*

- 1 belt, trousers, web
- 2 leggins, pair
- 2 scarfs, field
- 1 shoes, russet, pair
- 2 shirts, flannel
- 2 socks, cotton, pair
- 3 trousers, s/s
- 1 hat, field
- 1 strap, leather
- 1 ornament, cap, bronze
- 2 sets, chevrons, s/s

##### *For Dress*

- 1 cap, dress
- 1 coat, dress
- 2 gloves, cotton, pairs
- 1 trousers, dress, pair
- 1 ornament, cap, gilt
- 1 ornaments, collar, pairs
- 1 overcoat, s/w
- 1 belt dress with plate
- 1 chevrons, dress, set

## MAILING LIST OF THE ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

The mailing list of the Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., offers an unexcelled means of keeping up to date with the latest school teachings.

The School announces that the mailing list for 1926-1927 will contain, in addition to other things:

Conferences and Problems on Tactics of Infantry Units; on the Supply of Infantry Units; and on Military Intelligence and Staff Work.

Conferences on Training Management (one of the most important subjects in the army to-day).

Conferences on Drill and Command (emphasizing cadence drill).

Conferences on the preparation of illustrations for instruction purposes.

The principles are set forth in the conferences, and their application is furnished in the selective problems.

The first consignment of the 1926-1927 Mailing List has been issued and is composed of the following pamphlets:

Estimate of the Situation—Map Problem.

Machine Guns in Defense—Notes.

Methods of Instruction—Lecture.

Rifle Company in Defense—Map Problem.

Scouting and Patrolling—Notes.

Small Units in Approach March and Attack—Demonstration.

Tanks and Tank Tactics—Conferences.

Reserve officers who desire to improve their military knowledge by the study of correct military teachings cannot do better than to subscribe to this Mailing List. The cost is very reasonable, only \$1.50 a year. A reserve officer desiring to subscribe should address the "Book Shop, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.," enclosing check or money order for \$1.50, and request that his name be placed on the Infantry School Mailing List for 1926-1927. His name, rank, arm (U.S.M.C.R.) and address should be given.

## LETTERS OF APPRECIATION FOR RESERVE ACTIVITIES

The Major General Commandant has sent a letter of appreciation to the Commanding Officers of the Central and Western Reserve Areas complimenting these officers on the fine work done by their areas in recruiting for the Reserve, and expressing the appreciation of the Major General Commandant to the Commanding Officer and officers and men of the Recruiting Service in their areas for the interest taken in, and the results attained for the Reserve.

## REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMISSION IN MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Applicants for commission in the Marine Corps Reserve should check carefully before applying, the following regulations regarding appointment as commissioned officers in the Reserve:



(1) *Appointment as Commissioned Officer, Fleet Reserve.*—All appointments will be as second lieutenants, except that former officers of the Marine Corps who apply within one year from date of separation from the service may be commissioned in the rank they last held in the regular service. For appointment as second lieutenant the candidate must:

- (a) Be between twenty and twenty-eight years of age.
- (b) Be qualified for a commission as established by record, standing in his community, character, manner and bearing, and capacity for leadership.
- (c) Present satisfactory evidence of educational qualifications, or pass an examination in the following subjects: Spelling, grammar, composition and rhetoric, United States history, general history, geography, arithmetic, algebra, geometry and plane trigonometry.
- (d) Have the prescribed physical qualifications.
- (e) Have one of the requirements listed in paragraph (1-e) of this article, or
- (f) Be a man of outstanding ability in his profession or occupation in civil life whose experience in his profession or occupation will be of value to the Marine Corps in time of war or national emergency, or
- (g) Be a graduate of a college or university, under twenty-seven years of age, who although without the military experience and training required for appointment in the reserve, can and will, in the opinion of the examining board, qualify professionally by taking annual training and one of the basic correspondence courses.

Unless the applicant can submit proof that he has the qualifications listed in these regulations, he will not be recommended by the examining board for a commission, as the board must hold strictly to regulations and cannot assume that the candidate has the equivalent of the requirements. In submitting applications it should be remembered that the burden of proof is on the candidate, that is, the candidate must be able to convince the board by means of letters, affidavits, etc., that he has the necessary ability for a commission and clearly meets the requirements as laid down.

Sub-paragraph (f) of Article 13-25-5 is not used except strictly as indicated. Young men who are unable to qualify professionally will not be considered as coming under this paragraph and should not apply with that idea in mind.

At the present time a large number of applications are being received from young men who are not qualified and whom the board cannot commission, and if those who desire Reserve Commissions will check carefully their experience against the requirements, it will save them disappointment, as the Board cannot possibly recommend them for a commission unless they clearly come within the regulations.

#### EQUIPMENT FOR RESERVE COMPANIES

Equipment for Fleet Marine Corps Reserve Companies has been authorized by the Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps. This list of equipment will properly outfit these organizations for armory drill and for attending camps of instruction.

The following will be issued to each company:

## INDIVIDUAL ISSUE TO ENLISTED MEN

## 1 bag, clothing

## TO COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

60 rifles, Springfield, cal. 30	6 holsters, pistol, russet
60 bayonets	2 swords, non-commissioned officer
60 scabbards, bayonet	2 scabbards, sword, non-commissioned officer
60 slings, rifle	2 frogs, sword, non-commissioned officer, dress
60 belts, cartridge	2 haversacks, non-commissioned officer, staff
60 brushes and thongs	2 trumpets
66 cans, bacon	2 slings, trumpet, dress
66 cans, condiment	2 slings, trumpet, field
66 cans, meat	4 hooks, trumpet, sling
66 canteens, model 1910	2 banners, trumpet
66 carriers, pack (haversack)	8 flags, signal, semaphore
60 cases, oiler and thong	4 flags, signal, 2 feet, red
66 covers, canteen	4 flags, signal, 2 feet, white
60 covers, front sight, rifle	8 staffs, signal, semaphore
66 cups, canteen	8 staffs, signal, 2 length with carrier
66 forks, haversack	2 screwdrivers, rifle
64 haversacks	2 rods, cleaning, barracks, rifle
66 knives, haversack	1 kit, cleaning, pistol
66 packages, first aid	1 desk, field
66 pouches, first aid	1 typewriter, Underwood No. 5
64 ponchoes	1 safe, field
66 pouches, meat can (haversack)	1 chest, typewriter, field
66 spoons, haversack	2 padlocks, large
6 suspenders, cartridge belt, pistol	33 boxes, clothing barracks
6 pistols, Colt automatic, Cal. 45	
12 magazines, Colt automatic, Cal. 45	
6 belts, cartridge, pistol	
6 carriers, magazine, pistol	

If a company exceeds sixty men armed with a rifle, a proportionate increase in individual equipment will be made.

MARINE CORPS INSTITUTE COURSES FOR FLEET MARINE CORPS  
RESERVE COMPANIES

Enrolment of members of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve Companies in the Marine Corps Institute has been authorized. This will make available to the members of these companies the correspondence school courses that previously had been available only to members of the regular Marine Corps.

Great interest has already been taken in this privilege by members of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve Companies; one company alone, the 309th at Philadelphia, has forty-seven men enrolled in the correspondence school courses out of a total of sixty.

Company Commanders who desire additional information should write direct to the Director, Marine Corps Institute, Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C.

## BAYONET QUALIFICATIONS

A report showing those members of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve who qualified on the bayonet course at Quantico during the summer training period of 1926-1927, gives the 306th Company, Detroit, Michigan, First

Lieutenant William V. Calhoun, U.S.M.C.R., Commanding, first place; this company having qualified the largest number of men. Other companies in order were as follows:

305th Company, Philadelphia, Pa.  
302nd Company, Rochester, N. Y.  
301st Company, Boston, Mass.  
309th Company, Philadelphia, Pa.

#### TRAINING CAMPS

For the training of officers and men of the Marine Corps Reserve this summer, the group training plan will again be followed, and at Quantico, Va., three camps authorized. The first camp from June 13th to 25th; the second from July 11th to 23d, and the third from July 25th to August 6th. Regular training schedules for both the officers and men have been issued. This training will cover, for the Company, School of the Squad, School of the Soldier, Close and Extended Order, Interior Guard Duty, Sighting and Aiming Exercises, Rifle Marksmanship, Bayonet Exercises, Bayonet Instruction with the opportunity to qualify on the bayonet range, Lectures and Demonstrations of Machine Guns and 37-mm. guns, Demonstrations and actual practice with hand grenades, both dummy and live, Lectures and Practical Work in Scouting and Patrolling. For the officers, School of the Soldier, Nomenclature of the Rifle, Sighting and Aiming Drills, Bayonet Instruction with the opportunity of qualifying, nomenclature of Machine Guns and 37-mm. guns, nomenclature of the Pistol, Handling 3-inch Trench Mortars, Firing on Rifle and Pistol Ranges, Firing Rifle and Pistol with opportunity to qualify, Artillery Demonstrations, Instruction in Aviation, Lectures on Camp Sanitation, Artillery, and Overseas Expeditions. From Reveille at 5.30 A.M. to Recall at 4.00 P.M. the day will be fully occupied.

#### TYPE OF MEN ENLISTING IN THE RESERVE

Among those recently enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve, Class VI, at New Orleans, La., were Lee Christmas, Jr., and Harold J. Earle. Lee Christmas, Jr., is the son of the late General Lee Christmas, one of the greatest American soldiers of fortune in Latin-American history, who died here in New Orleans at Touro Infirmary in 1924. And Harold J. Earle is the son of that soldier of fortune, whom Richard Harding Davis, is said to have portrayed faithfully in his world-famous book of that name. The fathers of those two boys probably have seen more "help-yourself" fighting up and down Central America than any two men in the turbulent history of that stretch of tropical land.

In Honduras and Guatemala where he fought many a campaign, particularly in Honduras where he unseated governments and kept others in power—General Lee Christmas has become one of the great traditions. All over the country, yet, in tropical city and by lonely campfire you can hear tales of his courage and his daring exploits. It is a fighting tradition he has left behind him.

## TROPHIES

The Marine Corps Reserve Officers' Association of the District of Columbia has offered an "Efficiency Guidon," full standard Army guidon size, scarlet silk and gold letters, to the Reserve Company attending camp at Quantico during the summer training period, which has the highest total percentage in the following:

- 15% Attendance at Armory drill for January to June, or from date placed on pay status in 1927.
- 15% Attendance at Training Camp
- 15% Inspection of Company; Appearance of men and equipment.
- 10% Number enlisted men qualified during the Training Period on the rifle range.
- 15% Proficiency in close-order drill.
- 5% Proficiency in extended order drill.
- 5% Proficiency in bayonet practice.
- 20% Military courtesy.

Major N. A. Eastman, U.S.M.C., Commanding Officer of the 8th Regiment at Philadelphia, has donated a cup to be competed for annually by the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve Companies in the Eastern Reserve Area while on active duty during the summer training period.

Klenfuss, Incorporated, of New York City, of which Lieutenant H. C. Klenfuss and Lieutenant M. B. O'Connell are directors, has offered a cup to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve Company, to be competed for annually and awarded the company whose officers and men attain the highest percentage in rifle marksmanship while on active summer training duty.

## SIGNAL NOTES

In the December, 1926, issue of the GAZETTE it was stated that further progress in the matter of permanent allocation of frequencies for Marine Corps field radio nets would be reported in subsequent issues. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, has approved the following frequencies for the Marine Corps, and these frequencies are now available for training purposes and expeditionary use outside of the continental limits of the United States. Upon approval by the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (not yet granted), they will be available for use within the United States on manœuvres and for barracks training. Only undamped wave radio telegraphy will be used. Wireless telephony will not be permitted, as it is wasteful of air channels.

Force net, Brigade net and two Regimental nets:

285 KCS  
360 KCS  
435 KCS  
475 KCS

For artillery nets, for communication between artillery and aircraft, and between aircraft and infantry:

635 KCS  
685 KCS



For communication between infantry units separated not more than five miles:

Any two frequencies between 3947 KCS and 4000 KCS.

Certain other confidential frequencies for communication between Force Headquarters and the Fleet.

There will soon be delivered to the Marine Corps, probably in March, 1927, three Navy type RG radio-receiving sets. These sets are expeditionary equipment and two of them will be assigned to Quantico and one to San Diego. They cover the range 1000-20,000 kilocycles, and will be used in the Navy high-frequency intercept chain.

Eight receivers, type "Western Electric 3A," are being withdrawn from the Fleet, and will be delivered to the Marine Corps. These receivers are to be assigned to infantry regiments and artillery battalions and regiments for the sole purpose of receiving messages from aircraft. When the situation requires, they may be assigned to infantry battalions.

Four of the most recent design of the SCR 130 sets have been ordered from the Army.

In order to improve the quality of radio operators furnished to the fixed shore radio stations of the Naval Communication Service operated by the Marine Corps, a source of supply has been created from which all replacements to these stations will be furnished. Eight qualified graduates of the Radio School, Signal Battalion, will be kept under instruction at the Radio Station, Quantico, for a minimum period of two months. Thereafter, when reported as qualified, they will be available for transfer to other fixed shore radio stations for duty. This school at the Radio Station will be kept in continuous operation, and should be able to furnish qualified operators in ample numbers.

#### AN ANALYSIS OF RIFLE QUALIFICATIONS

In the making of calculations to determine the best method of awarding the "Franklin Wharton Cup" to the company having the highest figure of merit for rifle qualifications, an analysis was made of the total qualifications in the Marine Corps over a period of nearly three years, with interesting results.

In the method previously used in making the award, the multiplying factor was based on the percentage that the qualifying score is of the possible score. For example, the qualifying score for expert riflemen is now 306 out of a possible 350, which is 87 per cent. For a sharpshooter the qualifying score is 83 per cent., and for a marksman 69 per cent. The calculation was made by multiplying the total number of men qualifying in each grade of marksmanship by the percentage factor as figured above, and dividing the sum of the figures so obtained by the number of men firing. Actually, as we all know, it is more than 4 per cent. more difficult to qualify as an expert than to qualify as a sharpshooter.

In the following analysis an attempt has been made to determine the relative superiority of an expert rifleman over a sharpshooter, and of a sharp-

shooter over a marksman. The figures on which the results hereafter obtained are based are as follows :

TABLE I

ER	SS	MM	UNQ	FIRE	YEAR
3682	3915	6646	2729	16,972	1924
3279	3392	7699	1973	16,343	1925
3033	3116	7190	1311	14,650	1926 (9 mo.)

The percentages of qualification based on the foregoing figures are as follows :

TABLE II

ER	SS	MM	UNQ	YEAR
22	23	39	16	1924
20	21	47	12	1925
21	21	49	9	1926 (9 mo.)

Noting that the percentages for expert riflemen and sharpshooter have remained practically constant, as well as being almost exactly the same for both grades over a period of three years, and noting also that the percentage of marksmen has been increasing, the following table is believed to closely approximate the percentage of marksmanship qualifications for each grade :

TABLE III

ER .....	20 per cent.
SS .....	20 per cent.
MM .....	50 per cent.
UNQ .....	10 per cent.

The above data indicates the almost constant ratio of percentages obtained under various qualifying scores, which, for the period under consideration, have been as follows :

TABLE IV

From January 1, 1924, to July 1, 1924

ER .....	293
SS .....	275
MM .....	240

From July 1, 1924, to June 30, 1925

ER .....	300
SS .....	285
MM .....	250

From July 1, 1925, to the present time

ER .....	306
SS .....	290
MM .....	240

With the foregoing figures in mind, it can with safety be assumed that no change in the present qualifying scores will be radical enough to alter the closely approximate percentage of qualifications in the various grades, as shown in Table III.

Of any 100 men, chosen at random, 20 should be experts, 20 sharpshooters, 50 marksmen, and 10 unqualified. Let us disregard, for the moment, the 10 unqualified men.

Out of the 90 men remaining, all qualified, 40 will be sharpshooters or better. For the average man among the marksmen to qualify as a sharpshooter, he will have to beat the scores of 25 of the 90 men, and therefore a sharpshooter may be considered as 25/90, or 27 per cent., better than a marksman. We will call it 25 per cent. for convenience, and 25 per cent. is sufficiently accurate.

Of the 40 men above marksmen, 20 are sharpshooters and 20 are experts. For the average man among the sharpshooters to be an expert, he would have to beat the scores of 10 of the 40 men, and therefore an expert rifleman may be considered 25 per cent. better than a sharpshooter.

Let  $x$  = a factor for marksmen.

Then  $x + \frac{x}{4} = \frac{5x}{4}$  = a factor for sharpshooters.

And  $\frac{5x}{4} + \frac{5x}{16} = \frac{25x}{16}$  = a factor for expert riflemen.

Reducing to a common denominator, the results are

$16x$  = a factor for marksmen.

$20x$  = a factor for sharpshooters.

$25x$  = a factor for expert riflemen.

Change the factor for marksmen from  $16x$  to  $15x$  for convenience of computation, and the ratios are as follows:

$15 : 20 : 25 = 3 : 4 : 5$ .

This means that with a marksman considered as worth 3, a sharpshooter would be worth 4, and an expert rifleman worth 5.

To return to the 10 unqualified men, no such methods as the foregoing are applicable because there is no means of equating a man who cannot shoot at all with a man who can shoot fairly well. The only logical way of taking them into consideration is by dividing for the final figure of merit by the total number of men who have fired, thus making the unqualified man a drag on his organization.

As a result of the foregoing calculations, the conditions of award of the Franklin Wharton Cup have been changed, as announced in Headquarters Bulletin No. 16, of 20 January, 1927, to read as follows:

"In arriving at the figure of merit the following computations will be made: Multiply the number of expert riflemen by 5; multiply the number of sharpshooters by 4; multiply the number of marksmen by 3. Divide the sum of the figures obtained as above by the number of men who fired to obtain the final figure of merit."

#### INTERNATIONAL FREE RIFLE TEAM

The International Free Rifle Team Match will be fired the first of June this year at Rome, Italy, and the National Rifle Association has begun preparations for a team to represent the United States in this match.

After holding this championship for several years the Swiss regained it from us the last time it was shot, so the United States will make a particular effort to try to recapture this championship.

The Army has placed at the disposal of the National Rifle Association a rifle range in each Corps Area for practice and tryouts of Army, National Guard and Civilian competitors, and the Marine Corps has started training of a small squad at Quantico under Captain Joseph Jackson and a similar squad at Parris Island under Marine Gunner Calvin Lloyd in preparation for the final tryouts that will be held in Quantico about April 15th. The National Rifle Association will pay the expenses of the winner in the preliminary tryouts to be held in each Corps Area and of course any other competitors can enter the final tryouts at their own expense. The Marine Corps competitors will not be entered in the preliminary tryouts but all of them will be assembled at the expense of the Marine Corps at Quantico in ample time for the finals in April.

Captain Harry L. Smith has been designated by the National Rifle Association to captain the team and the selection of a coach will be left to him. From the candidates we have available and now in training, it is believed that the Marine Corps will have a creditable representation among the shooting members of this team.

#### RECRUITING SITUATION

JANUARY, 1927

During the entire year it has been more or less difficult to keep down to strength (18,000) rather than up to strength. For the past two years there has been a noticeable increase in the number of high school graduates and undergraduates from colleges and academies entering the Corps. This class of applicants is the most desirable for us and continued efforts will be made to procure them. Perhaps the main reason for the interest shown by this desirable type in our branch of the service is that we are active in things that interest them. Since the war there has been a growing tendency on the part of the young men of this country to lose interest in travel, except for short duration, and they are not desirous of straight soldiering. Neither do our educational offerings enthuse those who have had a high school education. Most applicants want to learn a trade or be entertained—probably the latter appeals most to the majority of them.

The percentage of reënlistments is not so high as it has been in past years. For example, in 1920 it was 38.56 and in 1926 it was 28.31. This steady decrease is due to the fact that young men are not making a career of the service. They come in for one or perhaps two enlistments and as they grow older they desire a home and family; consequently they settle in some favorite locality and make use of their experience. Most of these men are still interested in the happenings of the Corps, as shown by our rapidly growing Reserve and the steady increase in membership of the Marine Corps League.

When a desirable man fails to reënlist we want him in the Reserve; if that is not possible, we want him in the Marine Corps League. By his becoming a member of any one of our three organizations we can keep him interested and posted in Marine Corps affairs.

It is vastly important that the esprit of ex-marines be kept alive, as they



can be of invaluable assistance to our recruiting parties, mail guards, aviators, and in protecting the rights and future of the Corps in their community. As years pass their influence becomes more important. They rise in different walks of life and some few progress to important positions where the destinies of the Corps are in their hands. They are quickly reaching a stand similar to that of the alumni of colleges and universities—and what success would such institutions have without the influence of their alumni?

#### BRITISH MARINES ORDERED TO CHINA

Recent press despatches announce that one battalion of British Marines, strength one thousand officers and enlisted men, has been embarked at Portsmouth for transportation to China, where they are to be employed in protecting British residents of that country during the unsettled conditions incident to the civil war now in progress there.

The following item from the *London Daily Mail* is quoted here as it gives some interesting facts concerning the British Marines:

#### THE MEN WHO ARE OFF TO CHINA

*By a Naval Correspondent*

Although the King is their Colonel-in-Chief and they are physically—and in other ways, too—one of the finest bodies of men wearing His Majesty's uniform, it is only upon such occasions as the present despatch of a battalion to China that the Royal Marines come into the limelight. Being quartered in the naval ports of Chatham, Plymouth, and Portsmouth they are not "seen about" to the same extent that Army units are.

Then, again, they occupy an anomalous position halfway between Army and Navy. Afloat, the Royal Marine is under the Navy Discipline Act; ashore he is under the Army Act, yet he is a part of the Navy all the time and the administrative headquarters of his corps are at the Admiralty. He is dressed like a soldier and drilled like a soldier, with a certain amount of Navy training added, and he is enlisted for the purpose of serving aboard warships. In short, he is a sea soldier.

The first Royal Marines were the soldiers who were in olden days embarked for duty in men-o'-war. Only the larger warships these days carry Royal Marine detachments, whose duties aboard are not greatly different from those of the bluejackets. In addition to manning guns and taking part in the general work of the ship, the Marines provide sentries, officers' servants, and men for special duties.

In the *Renown* at the present moment the Duke of York has a Marine orderly and Marine orderlies are in charge of the Royal apartments. The Royal hairdresser is a Marine, too. The Royal Naval School of Music, which provides bands for the whole navy, is also a Marine establishment.

In the old days when sailors were inclined to be mutinous the Marine detachment of a ship was always berthed between the officers and the crew as a measure of protection. That custom still obtains, for tradition dies hard.

A high standard is demanded of all recruits, for the Royal Marines have a record of fighting in all parts of the world of which every officer and man is justifiably proud. Their badge of the globe (given them by George IV) wreathed with laurel and surmounted by "Gibraltar" and their motto "Per Mare, Per Terram" are a recognition of this. The Royal Marines are one of the few regiments that have the right to march through the City of London with bayonets fixed.

## BRIGHT WORK ON BAYONETS

In the British Marines for some time past the custom has been not to polish the metal of bayonets and scabbards, but to allow the metal to become oxidized or dulled so as not to show bright. This was done with a view to securing invisibility during campaigns on shore, but frequent objections arose aboard ship on account of the slack appearance of the dull metal of the bayonets and scabbards.

The following item from the *Westminster Gazette* shows the action taken by the British Admiralty Office looking toward improving the appearance of the Marines serving aboard ship in this respect:

## BRIGHT BAYONETS

*Admiralty Order to the Marines*

The Admiralty has had another brain-wave.

Fleet Orders notify that it has been decided that the blades, pommels, and cross-pieces of sword bayonets of Royal Marines and the lockets and chapes of the scabbards are to be polished.

And in case any Marine should employ a domestic for the purpose, the safeguard is laid down that "the polishing will be carried out by the non-commissioned officers and men concerned. The grips, nuts, and screws are not to be removed for this purpose, and care is to be taken to avoid injuring these components."

Arrangements are to be made for the polished bayonets and scabbards to be rusted or otherwise dulled in H. M. ships as far as practicable in the event of R. M. Detachments being required to land for service.

## EDITORIAL

**T**HE Sixty-ninth Congress ended its sessions at noon on March 4, 1927, and it is a matter of interest to the Marine Corps to briefly review its acts with regard to the Corps.

The Naval Appropriation Act providing the necessary money for the naval establishment for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1927, provided money for the Marine Corps sufficient to keep the enlisted strength at the present figure of 18,000 and to provide for the maintenance of that force, but the reduced appropriations will make careful economy necessary.

The Congress also enacted a law authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with the construction of certain public works at Quantico, Virginia. This act does not, however, carry any appropriation of money for making actual contracts for the construction.

After several years' study of the project for rebuilding the barracks and other buildings at Quantico, a comprehensive plan has been evolved covering the whole project and including barracks, storehouses, powerhouse, and officers' quarters for housing the East Coast Expeditionary Force of approximately 4000 strength.

The Act passed by the last Congress provided for a portion of the project, viz.: one regimental group of barracks, \$850,000; three storehouses, \$225,000; commissary, bakery, cold storage and ice plant, \$150,000; motor transport storehouse and repair plant, \$100,000; disciplinary barracks, \$30,000; power house and equipment in part, \$380,000; apartment houses for officers, not to exceed \$370,000; improvement of grounds and distributing systems in part \$100,000; total, \$2,205,000, to be accounted for as one fund. This bill was introduced by Mr. Coyle, of Pennsylvania, member of Congress and formerly an officer of the Marine Corps. Mr. Coyle has taken great interest in the Marine Corps and its needs and his efficient and intelligent efforts were largely responsible for securing the passage of the Act which will make it possible to replace the temporary buildings of wartime construction at Quantico by fine and enduring modern buildings.

Immediately after the passage of the Act above referred to authorizing the construction of a part of the buildings included in the plan for the New Quantico, the question of securing an appropriation in the last Congress for the immediate construction of a part of the buildings authorized was taken up, and as a result the Second Deficiency Bill carried the following provision:

"Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia: For construction of public works as authorized by the Act approved February 15, 1927, \$1,650,000; and the Secretary of the Navy is authorized to enter into contract or contracts for such construction at a cost in the aggregate not to exceed \$2,205,000."

The Second Deficiency Bill passed the House of Representatives without

division and it was expected that it would pass the Senate in the closing days of the session, but this action was prevented by continued arguments over what was known as the "Slush Fund Investigation" resolution. The "fillibuster" tactics employed with regard to the latter legislation prevented the Second Deficiency Bill from coming to a vote in the Senate up to the hour of the closing of Congress at noon on March 4, 1927, and now the whole question will have to be taken up anew in the next Congress which assembles at Washington in December, 1927.

As noted above, if this deficiency bill had been passed by the Senate it would have been possible to immediately make contracts for the buildings covered by the authorization Act amounting to \$2,205,000 and to construct in the following year buildings to the cost amount of \$1,650,000, which would have gone a long ways toward providing modern buildings for our important station at Quantico.

The legislation will be taken up when the next Congress assembles, and it is hoped that next year will witness the definite beginning of the construction of the New Quantico.

There was also carried in the Second Deficiency Bill at the time of its failure to pass the Senate something over \$800,000 to defray the increased expenses due to the maintenance of the Mail Guards during four months ending in February, 1927, and \$30,000 for the construction of a bridge across Archer's Creek, at Parris Island, S. C.

The employment of not to exceed 2500 officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps as Mail Guards to protect the United States Mails from the depredations of bandits and robbers was ordered by the President in October, 1926, and the performance of this duty required the expenditure of approximately \$800,000 over and above the regular expenditure for the maintenance of the Corps.

The bridge across Archer's Creek will complete the connecting link by highway between the Marine Barracks at Parris Island and the roadways on the mainland, and is a much needed improvement. The construction of this much needed bridge will now have to wait until the next Congress appropriates the \$30,000 necessary to build it. The fills and roadbeds have been completed, on the Parris Island side, by the work of Marines stationed at Parris Island, and on the mainland side by the state of South Carolina and the bridge would complete the link and make possible motor traffic between the state highways and the road system of Parris Island.

Due to the urgent need for Marine Forces for the protection of American interests and policies in Nicaragua and China, the troops on duty as Mail Guards were withdrawn from that duty some weeks ahead of the schedule which had been planned.

In the fall of 1926 the Sacassa Revolution in Nicaragua had assumed such proportions that it was deemed advisable to send Marines there to protect American citizens and property, and on January 7, 1927, the 2d



Battalion of the Fifth Regiment, then on duty at Guantanamo, Cuba, was embarked and sailed for Nicaraguan waters to join the Special Service Squadron under command of Rear Admiral Lattimer. In February, 1927, the force of Marines in Nicaragua was augmented by a Marine Aviation force from San Diego, Cal., with six D. H. planes, and one infantry company from San Diego.

On February 23, 1927, the 1st and 3d Battalions, and the 43d Company of the Fifth Regiment of Marines embarked at Quantico, Va., aboard the U. S. S. *Henderson* and sailed for Nicaragua, arriving at Corinto on March 6, 1927. Brigadier General Logan Feland sailed aboard the *Henderson* and is now commanding general of the Marine Corps Force on duty in Nicaragua, as a part of the Special Service Squadron.

The unsettled conditions of war which have prevailed for some time in China had caused the Admiral in command of the Asiatic Fleet to transfer most of the available Marines from Guam and the Philippines to China for the protection of American lives and property; and on February 3, 1927, the Fourth Regiment of Marines embarked at San Diego, Cal., aboard the U. S. S. *Chaumont* and sailed for China, arriving at Shanghai on February 24, 1927.

Brigadier General S. D. Butler was ordered to command the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, Asiatic Fleet, and is now en route to China by mail steamer.

Thus we see the Marines again on expeditionary duty in foreign countries for the protection of American lives and property and for the safeguarding of the policies of our Government. As has so often been the case in the past, the urgent call for these expeditions came suddenly and the ease and precision with which the various units got away from their home stations and proceeded to the zones of trouble again demonstrated the value of having trained expeditionary forces always ready for any service required.

As is always the case, these unexpected calls for large bodies of Marines for distant overseas service make unforeseen drains upon the regular appropriations for the maintenance of the Corps and this added to the failure of the deficiency legislation to provide for the large expenditures required by the operations of the Mail Guards will make it very difficult to keep the Corps at full strength during the remainder of the fiscal year, which ends on June 30, 1927.

It has frequently been advanced that the Marine Corps owes much in training, readiness for service and esprit to the frequent peacetime expeditions overseas which have marked its history since the Spanish-American War in 1898, and for this reason the opportunity for expeditionary service at present in two such widely separated fields of action as Nicaragua and China should be welcomed by the officers and men of the Corps.

The Mail Guard duty scattered 2500 officers and enlisted men throughout the United States and made the Marine in uniform a familiar sight to millions of citizens of the country. Many reports from local officials and private

citizens have been received praising the appearance and behavior of the men on the mail guard duty, and the effect of this upon recruiting has been pronounced. It has been difficult to keep the number down to the authorized strength, reenlistments have increased, and the number of men surrendering from desertion during the past few months has much exceeded the number of desertions for the same period. First enlistments have therefore been reduced to a minimum and will have to be kept at a low figure for the remainder of the fiscal year to keep within the authorized strength and to effect economy in expenditures of the remaining funds.

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC., REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF CONGRESS  
OF AUGUST 24, 1912

OF THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, published quarterly at  
Philadelphia, Pa., for April, 1925.

Washington, D. C. } ss.

Before me, an Adjutant and Inspector in the U. S. Marine Corps (authorized to administer oaths), personally appeared Edward W. Sturdevant, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the Editor of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management (and if a daily paper, the circulation), etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, embodied in section 443, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor and business managers are:  
Publisher, Marine Corps Association, 227 South 6th St., Philadelphia, Pa.  
Editor, Edward W. Sturdevant, Hdqrs. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.  
Managing Editor: None.  
Business Managers: None.
2. That the owners are: (Give names and addresses of individual owners, or if a corporation, give its name and the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 per cent. or more of the total amount of stock.)  
Marine Corps Association, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.
3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent. or more of the total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) None.
4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which the stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bonafide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association, or corporation, has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds, or other securities than as so stated by him.
5. That the average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the six months preceding the date shown above is.....(This information is required from daily publications only).

(Signed) EDWARD W. STURDEVANT

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 28th day of May, 1925.

(Seal)

(Signed) M. R. THACHER,  
Major Asst. Adjutant and Inspector.